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ABSTRACT 

Human trafficking is an issue that has been largely overlooked by Japanese policy makers 
and remains a concerning social issue confronting Japanese society. Sources have criticized for 
Japan on how they have addressed their trafficking protocol, and external pressures remain 
critical of Japan's approach to their human trafficking policy. What is often overlooked is that 
Japan, as a country with significant socio-economic prowess and influence in the global 
community, is able to respond to these criticisms in such a way because they are less vulnerable 
to the repercussions that disregarding such criticisms entails. Japan is able to remain culturally 
relative to their own societal issues because of their strong position, which is often not the case 
for countries in developing or transitioning stages. Furthermore, when Japan has taken the 
initiative to adopt anti-trafficking policies, the results have impacted migratory trends overall and 
have left potential migrant even more vulnerable to traffickers. 
The objectives of this thesis are twofold. First, it will examine how human trafficking 
policies have impacted overall migration trends into Japan. This will particularly explore how 
migrants from transitioning and developing nations have been disproportionately affected by 
human trafficking policies implemented by Japan. This "third world bias" in the administration 
of trafficking policy has caused many potential migrants to seek out illicit third parties to 
facilitate entry into Japan, thus exacerbating Japan's human trafficking problem. Second, it will 
demonstrate how attitudes of cultural relativism and self-perception within Japanese society 
appear in the area of Japanese policy enactment. As a result, there persists an ongoing conflict 
between international demands and domestic Japanese objectives which has implications for the 
ways in which Japan responds to global criticism. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
When one conceptualizes human trafficking and labor exploitation, the images evoked 
are often ones of developing and transitioning nations with weak infrastructures experiencing a 
significant degree of internal strife. Given its level of economic and social development, 
conventional wisdom would most likely dismiss the idea of Japan as a country suffering from an 
elevated level ofhuman trafficking. However, unbeknownst to many, Japan is perceived to be 
experiencing one of the most concerning levels of human trafficking in the developed world. In 
recent years, NGOs, activists, scholars, and governmental organizations have paid increasing 
attention to the conditions ofhuman trafficking within Japan's borders and have yielded a variety 
of different perspectives on the reality and the severity of Japan's human trafficking situation. 
The majority of trafficking victims in Japan are believed to be trafficked into the sex and 
entertainment industry, which is a massive industry that generates trillions of yen in profits 
(billions of USD) annually which accounts for 2-3% of Japan's GNP (Dean 2008: 169). This 
industry consists ofprostitution brothels, dance halls, strip clubs, soap lands, massage parlors, 
hostlhostess clubs, "pink salons", nopankissa, and a variety of other establishments where sex 
mayor may not be sold. l The victims trafficked into this industry are predominantly women 
(and in some cases children) primarily from Southeast Asian countries, particularly from the 
I Soaplands are establishments where customers can seek out a soapy massage, though often times 
involve various forms of sexual acts. Host and hostess clubs are establishments were customers pay for 
the company ofthe opposite sex to eat bar snacks and drink with them in exchange for flirtatious 
conversation. While not expected or anticipated, sex does occur between clients and employees. Pink 
salons are establishments where customers can enter and purchase oral sex and alcohol. Nopankissa are 
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Philippines and Thailand. It is often deciphered in Japan that "sex and entertainment are one in 
the same" (Bales and Cornell 2008: 55) and that Japan is often perceived as being collectively 
tolerable of the nation's exposed sex industry (Morooka 2006: 69; Roberts 2000: 294). Such 
attitudes are believed to be responsible for Japan's relatively unconcerned approach to their 
trafficking protocol. There have also been cases ofmales being trafficked into construction, 
agriculture, and manufacturing, as well as women trafficked into sectors outside of sex work 
such domestic service, labor, and manufacturing (Friman 2011; U.S. Department of State 2009, 
2010,2011). However, victims trafficked outside of the sex industry represent a minority who 
are often assigned to the margins of human trafficking discourse - especially so in the context of 
Japan. 
The situation in Japan is particularly complex because there exists much ambiguity in 
terms of what actually constitutes a "trafficked person". Establishing whether a migrant who has 
been or is being exploited was coerced, deceived, or misled into their working conditions, or 
whether they have willingly accepted such terms ofemployment, is very difficult to determine 
both under Japanese law and in actual practice. Furthermore, it is also difficult to determine in 
which establishments human trafficking actually exists and in where exploitative labor actually 
being performed. While prostitution is technically illegal in Japan, the industry is still very 
widespread and there are numerous loopholes through which sexual services continue to persist 
and provide services. Such conditions induce a complex and ambiguous situation of human 
trafficking where it becomes challenging to determine who trafficking victims actually are, 
where human trafficking is actually occurring, and to what extent migrants are being exploited. 
establishments were waitresses wear short skirts and no underpants above a mirrored floor, so customers 
have a clear view ofwhat is under their skirt. 
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This thesis will demonstrate how Japan's status as a relatively strong socio-economic 
power allows it to engage in more cultural relativist practices regarding their human trafficking 
policy administration. It will also examine claims that human trafficking legislation has 
negatively impacted migratory trends into Japan and explore in what ways migration has been 
affected by Japan's human trafficking legislation, in particular how it has impacted nationals 
from developing and transitioning nations disproportionately and depicted a "third world bias" in 
the administration of trafficking policies. In order to explain Japan's actions and cultural 
relativist appropriations, Japan will be compared to the nation of Georgia. Georgia and Japan 
have received similar classifications of their trafficking levels by international sources, however, 
Georgia has been acknowledged for their progressive anti-trafficking efforts while Japan has 
remained universally censured for their lackluster approach to human trafficking policy_ This 
analysis will show what variables account for Japan's implementation (or lack thereot) in its 
anti-trafficking protocol and will show how these factors influence Georgia (and countries in 
similar socio-economic standing) in different ways than a country life Japan. 
1.2. Background 
Contrary to the long standing myth of Japanese homogeneity, Japan has been a country 
with a significant and diversified Other presence that challenges these claims ofhomogeneity. 
One of the most recent and momentous challenges to the Japanese myth of homogeneity has 
surfaced in the past century, though most so in the past three decades, as migrants from across 
the globe have flocked to Japan for an assortment ofreasons (Befu 2001; Creighton 1997; 
Murphy-Shigematsu 2000; Siddle 2011). This section will briefly portray the history of 
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migration and seek to instill an understanding of who, when, why, regarding the movement of 
peoples into Japan. 
Japan has experienced an internal confrontation of an Other presence, in what John Lie 
describes as "indigenous minorities" in the forms of the burakumin, Ainu, and Okinawans (Lie 
2009: 164). The burakumin have developed as an outcast class of workers who have historically 
preformed jobs at the lowest realms of society. Such professions have caused them to be 
significantly marginalized in Japanese society and experienced widespread discrimination ­
some of which persists to this day and poses a significant Japanese societal issue (Siddle 2011). 
While still ethnically Japanese, the burakumin were designated as an Other because of their 
perceived inferior status. The Ainu, on the other hand, are the indigenous population of the most 
northern island of Hokkaido who were confronted that the Japanese continued their northward 
expansion. The Ainu have also been victims of severe discrimination which persists to this day 
and issues of assimilation and language preservation (Siddle 1997; 2011). The inhabitants of 
Japan's southernmost islands of Okinawa prefecture are a distinct cultural group with their own 
languages and customs and, like the Ainu and burakumin, have been subjugated in past 
encounters with Japan and still remain on the margins of Japanese society (Creighton 1997). 
Migration into Japan is typically divided into two categories: "oldcomers" and 
"newcomers". Oldcomers generally include Koreans and Chinese who migrated or were 
forcefully mobilized to Japan pre-World War II as laborers and servants. Newcomer migrants 
are post-World War II migrants who have come seeking economic advancement in business, 
education, manual labor, and entertainment - often associated with sex work. There is often a 
distinction made between these groups within one ethnic group. Therefore, a clear distinction is 
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often made between oldercomer Koreans and newcomer Koreans - same as oldercomer and 
newcomer Chinese. 
Under Japanese colonial rule, hundreds of thousands of Koreans and Chinese were 
transported and migrated to Japan to preform cheap and unpaid labor (Liu-Farrer 2009; Ryang 
2009: 78; Tai 2004). Many Koreans found themselves in exploitative conditions working in 
manual labor sectors of the Japanese economy such as mining. When the Pacific War broke out 
in 1941 an estimated 60,000 to 400,000 Korean women were mobilized as comfort women 
forced to sexually service the Japanese armed forces (Hicks 1997; Soh 2009; Tanaka 2002, 
y oshiaki 1995). This is an earlier example ofhuman trafficking, labor exploitation, and 
conditions that amounted to modern day slavery that have existed in a historical context within 
Japan and the Japanese empire. Although these factors fall outside the scope of this thesis, it is 
still important to recognize the existence of these institutional forms of slavery and servitude 
because it identifies a paradigm of tolerance towards such practices on the part of Japan. The 
Korean community in Japan peaked at around 2,000,000 and most repatriated to Korea after 
Japan's defeat in World War II. Those Koreans who stayed in Japan evolved into a community 
today known as Zainichi Koreans and are differentiated from "newcomer" Korean migrants who 
came in the postwar period. 
Along with Koreans, ethnic Chinese also made up a portion of the "oldercomer" migrants. 
Chinese were also brought over forcibly and willfully migrated to Japan for employment 
opportunities in various sectors in the prewar period (Liu-Farrer 2009). This population, as with 
Koreans, is differentiated from the newcomer Chinese migrants because of the drastically variant 
experiences in Japan, levels of assimilation, and personal feelings towards Japan and the 
Japanese people. Japan's postwar recovery was largely focused on nation-building and took 
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significant efforts to empower the Japanese people in the face of global competition (Befu 2001; 
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Metraux 1989; Sellek 2001). As a result, immigration into Japan was not encouraged and not 
until the 1970s did recognizable waves of immigrants and refugees began to reach Japan's shores. 
One of the earliest notable groups to arrive in Japan was prostitutes from other East Asian and 
Southeast Asian countries. In the late 1970s and early 1980s women from Philippines, South 
Korea, Thailand, and other areas throughout Asia migrated to Japan to engage in work as 
prostitutes. The termjapayuki-san, or "miss gone to Japan" became used to describe these 
female prostitutes (Muroi and Sasaki 2005: 185). This nomenclature is adapted from the term 
for Japanese prostitutes who traveled abroad in the late nineteenth century, referred to as 
"karayuki-san" or "miss gone abroad." Nobue Suzuki (2011) and Junya Morooka (2006) note 
that immigration officials referred to 1979 "year one" for the japayuki-san phenomenon. It is 
suspected that not long after their arrival, the scene of contemporary human trafficking began to 
take shape, as gangsters and members of organized crime began to exploit these women and even 
mobilize new women into Japan for such work (Friman 2001; Sellek 2001: 49). 
In the early to mid-l 980s, during the economic bubble, Japan was an attractive 
destination for migrants from around the world. This decade set the precedent for contemporary 
migration to Japan as new waves ofbusinessmen from North America and Europe and laborers 
from South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America began to penetrate 
Japanese society. Africans, Bangladeshis, Chinese, Filipinos, Indians, Iranians, Pakistanis, and 
many more nationalities began forming conspicuous communities in Japan's major cities. 
As a reaction to the unexpectedly profound flows ofmigration, Japan issued in the 1990s 
a series of laws intended to restrict the number ofmigrants entering the country and amended 
their laws so to legally foreigners of Japanese descent (Tsuda 2003: 91). Also, in an effort to 
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keep prominent the illusion of a "homogenous" Japan and at the same time to keep the flow of 
migration necessary to sustain Japanese economic production, migration regulations began to 
favor those migrants with Japanese heritage, particularly those from Latin America (Roth 2002; 
Tsuda 2003).2 At this point unprecedented number of dekasegi primarily from Brazil, Peru, and 
areas across Latin America "return migrated" to Japan to take up low wage jobs in factories 
doing manual labor. The strength of the Japanese yen made this work so lucrative, that middle 
class Japanese-Latin Americans, some ofwhom held prestigious jobs in their respective 
countries migrated to Japan for this purpose. 
An important note regarding contemporary migrant labor in Japan, is that they are 
engaged in work known as the 3 k's, which are kitanai, kitsui, and kiken, or in translation, the 3 
d's, dirty, demanding, and dangerous (Brody 2001; Friman 2001; Roth 2002; Tsuda 2003). 
These jobs are often facilitated by labor brokers who illegal workers engage and hire to secure a 
means of employment while in Japan. The necessity for these brokers stems from the 
incapability of migrants to secure jobs in Japan legally and independently due to Japan's highly 
restrictive immigration regulations against unskilled labor (Komai 1995,2001; SeBek 2001). 
In the 21 st century Japan remains a country receiving a notable number of migrants from 
throughout the world.3 As the Japanese popUlation ages and Japanese youth remain disinclined 
to take up low-wage positions there remain severe infrastructural concerns within the Japanese 
economy. The constant flow of immigrants from various countries helps to offset the labor 
shortages within the Japanese market. Japan continues to rely on these immigrants as a distinct 
2 Due to a variety of reasons including increased higher education rates, an aging population, and a 
disinclination ofJapanese youth to take up low-skilled positions, there existed a strong demand for 
workers to take up unskilled positions in various sectors. 
3 The overall number of registered foreigners in Japan has decreased steadily from 1955 (641,482) until it 
peaked in 2008 (2,217,426). 
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labor niche and immigration is only likely to increase as the Japanese population continues 
to decline. 
In the context of Japan, early modes of sexual slavery and domestic servitude­
particularly the exploitation ofwomen and girls - was prevalent as early as the 14th and 15th 
century when European explorers first arrived in Japan (Leupp 2003). Gary Leupp makes note 
that although bans on slave traffic were implemented, fonns of slavery continued to exist and 
that "sexual slavery was hardly a concern in Japan until the Meiji era" (ibid: 190). The 
movement of colonial subjects from China and Taiwan (Uu-Farrer 2009) and Korea (Hicks 1997; 
Soh 2009) were brought to Japan to work in mines, construction, or agriculture and endured 
experienced slave-like conditions while in Japan. Males were drafted as laborers and soldiers 
and females were compelled to work as sex workers and physical laborers. More modem cases 
of human trafficking - commonly referred to asjinshinbaibai orjinshintorihiki - arose when 
women from Asian nations began migrating to Japan in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As 
Japan's economy and subsequently its sex industry were flourishing, these women saw an 
opportunity at times when other Asian economies were struggling. It was here that members of 
organized crime syndicates intervened in the migration process and established the criminal 
enterprise of exploiting these women (Friman 2001; Komai 1995). 
Since this point in time, conditions of accused sexual exploitation and abusive conditions 
in sex and entertainment establishments have been rampant. Stories of women being beaten, 
killed, and raped under the control of third party crime syndicates have drawn the attention of 
scholars, international governments, and activists of all types. There is little doubt that sex 
trafficking remains the most prevalent fonn of trafficking into Japan. However, there is little 
other mention of exploitation that has occurred in sectors outside of the sex and entertainment 
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industry, such as construction, agriculture, or manufacturing (U.S. Department of State 2012; 
Yamanaka 2008). While many cases of exploitation certainly share similar traits to those of sex 
trafficking victims, the dearth of literature focusing on these issues and the ambiguities and 
complexities of the existing literature makes this form of trafficking far less noticeable. 
The tum of the century has continued to bring innovations to the trafficking process and 
traffickers have adapted their methods accordingly to globalized protocol which has aimed at 
stopping the illicit mobilization of people. There is little doubt that traffickers have responded to 
counter the protocol issued by Japan (and the international community) and that they have 
continued to trafficking unsuspecting victims into these industries. 
Human traffickers in Japan, as elsewhere, are intricate and sophisticated so to avoid 
unnecessary encounters with law enforcement which could jeopardize trafficking operations. 
The process has become highly organized and involves complex transnational criminal networks 
which prey on vulnerable migrants. The collaboration of various links in transnational criminal 
networking is crucial in the recruitment and captivity of victims. The recruitment process 
involves enticing unsuspecting victims in source countries ofhuman trafficking with promises of 
lucrative work in Japan. The recruiter can be a relative, an acquaintance, or a complete stranger 
and in countries where economic opportunities are scarce and families are in desperate need for 
resources, a well-paying job in Japan is often encouraged. Instances of families selling their 
children to recruiters or brokers for the economic benefit of the rest of the family are not 
uncommon. After a process of migration under false documents and illegal channels of entry 
into Japan, victims realize the severity of their situation when they are informed they are 
indebted to their captors for arranging their migration. 
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John Lie has noted how the "invisibility" of foreigners in Japan has led to their issues and 
grievances with Japan and Japanese society have fallen into the periphery of Japanese society 
despite their domestically driven activism (Lie 2009). Human trafficking similarly is at risk of 
falling into a state of "invisibility" in Japanese society (if it has not done so already) as both 
international and domestic pressures to address these matters are often subsumed by larger and 
more socio-politically driven issues. It is essential that Japan not let human trafficking concerns 
vanish completely; it will likely lead to an increase in human trafficking, as opportunistic 
traffickers will recognize the lack of authoritative attention and seek to mobilize new victims into 
Japan. 
Chapter 1 of this thesis has briefly introduced the problem of human trafficking in Japan 
and provides a short summarization of the parameters surrounding the undercurrents of the 
trafficking process. It has also contextualized pre-war and post-war migration into Japan and has 
drawn on the relationship between migration and human trafficking. Chapter 2 presents a review 
ofvarious literature and theoretical analyses that have arose from various sources on different 
aspects of human trafficking in Japan. Chapter 3 examines the legislative actions which have 
been implemented by Japan and presents empirical data and analysis on relevant aspects of the 
trafficking process. Chapter 4 looks at the situation of human trafficking in Japan in comparison 
to that of Georgia, in an effort to determine the differences in human trafficking protocol and 
what factors have been the drive forces behind these disparate courses of action. It is here that 
Japan's notions of cultural relativism and their socio-economic position within the global 
community will be examined. Chapter 5 concludes the document with a summary of the above 
chapters and reinforcement of the thesis findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE AND THEORY 
This chapter will present some of the different perspectives that have been projected 
regarding human trafficking in Japan. The publications and authors recognized below have all 
contributed to the analytical framework through which human trafficking in Japan can be 
contextualized in some significant way. Each source underscores different aspects of the 
trafficking process and approaches the issues in its own unique way. The following is intended 
to review and critically examine existing sources and interpretations on human trafficking in 
Japan. These sources have been selected because they emphasis a diverse range of aspects 
surrounding human trafficking in Japan and maintain particularly practical perspectives which 
others have drawn upon as resource. They primarily include sources of data from government 
agencies and scholarly analysis which reflects upon these sources of data. These varying 
perspectives aid in portraying the ambiguous, complex, and dynamic case of human trafficking 
in Japan and reviewing these sources can provide a great deal of insight into the reality of the 
problem.4 
2.1. Image of Human Trafficking 
The image of human trafficking is largely dictated from efforts of government agencies 
which intend to bring attention to the severity of the rights violations and atrocities that are 
4 The majority of the sources presented in this chapter have been almost exclusively written in the 21 st 
century. The main reason behind this is that it was not until the year 2000 that human trafficking, 
particularly human trafficking in Japan, began to galvanize significant attention. Sources prior to this 
date were not intentionally neglected, but rather were excluded because their relevancy has become 
somewhat dated in comparison to newer more recent perspectives. 
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endured by trafficking victims. There are three particularly sources which have been 
disseminated by government agencies that elaborate on issues ofhuman trafficking and labor 
exploitation. These sources will be analyzed and critically examined and in the following 
section interpretations of these sources and their containing findings will be presented. 
2.t.a. U.S. Department of State's Trafficking in Persons Report 
The U.S. Department of State has annually published its Trafficking in Persons Report 
(TIP Report) since 2000. The TIP Report is a country-by-country analysis on the human 
trafficking situation ofmost countries around the world. The report is disseminated annually and 
categorizes countries on a scale of "tiers" numbering one to three. The criteria for the 
categorization of nations are based on the guidelines defined by the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), the legislation implemented by the U.S. government which set 
international standards and protocol for systematically classifying and addressing human 
trafficking. 
The tier system can be summarized as follows: Tier 1 represents a supposed low level of 
human trafficking to take place and also indicates that a nation is in full compliance with the 
standards pronounced by the TVPA, while Tier 3 demonstrates that a nation's government makes 
no effort to comply with the TVP A and there is a very high level ofhuman trafficking that exists 
within in that country. Since its inception in 2000, the TIP Report has remained very critical of 
Japan and the nation's approach to human trafficking and the report has continuously disparaged 
Japan's action to address human trafficking. Every year except for 2004, Japan has been 
classified as a Tier 2 country. According to the U.S. TIP Report, Tier 2 is currently defined as 
described as "countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVP A's minimum 
12 

standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those 
standards." (U.S. Department of State 2011) 
In 2004, Japan was classified as a Tier 2 Watch List Country. This categorization placed 
Japan on the same level with countries such as Mexico, Laos, Cote d'Ivoire, and Guatemala, and 
just slightly higher than Venezuela, North Korea, and Sudan (U.S. Department of State 2004). 
This classification was interpreted as a global humiliation as Japan was the only developed 
nation to be placed on such a level. The 2004 TIP Report defined Tier 2 Watch List as: 
Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the Act's minimum 
standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance 
. with those standards, and: a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of 
trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing; or b) There is a failure 
to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in 
persons from the previous year; or c) The determination that a country is making 
significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with minimum standards 
was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps of the 
next year (U.S. Department of State 2004). 
The TIP Report has continually emphasized the high number of victims trafficked into 
Japan's sex industry and also noted the exploitation of both males and females which occurs in 
other sectors of the Japanese economy such as domestic servitude, construction, and 
manufacturing. The report has frequently underscored the consistency of victims trafficked 
through the Industrial Trainee and Technical Internship Program, which is a program through 
which immigrants can enter Japan and obtain professional skills (U.S. Department of State 2008, 
2009,2010,2011,2012). Exploitation through this trainee program has also been depicted by 
Richard H. Friman (2011). Friman explains how Chinese organized crime syndicates involved 
in human smuggling hold migrants in conditions of debt-bondage under the guise of such 
programs. Highlighting the exploitation that occurs under this trainee program are one of the 
few examples where a form of exploitation outside of sex trafficking has gained notoriety. 
13 
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As of the most recent report, the TIP Report still maintains that Japan is still "a 
destination, source, and transit country for men and women subjected to forced labor and sex 
trafficking, and for children subjected to sex trafficking" and that "The Government of Japan 
does not fully comply with the minimum standard for the elimination of trafficking [TVPA]; 
however, it is making significant efforts to do so" (U.S. Department of State 2012: 199). The 
report does not present any particularly new information regarding updates, recent legislations, 
or activisms focused on human trafficking in Japan. It did however stress that in 2011 the 
Japanese government did not arrest, prosecute, or convict any traffickers or "forced labor 
perpetrators" (U.S. Department of State 2012: 199). It also underscores that the 2005 revisions 
do not align with the Palermo Protocol of2000, and that Japan's definition of trafficking and 
overall approach to trafficking needs to be redefined (U.S. Department of State 2012: 200). 
2.1.b International Labor Organization 
In 2005 the International Labor Organization (ILO) issued a report entitled Human 
Trafficking/or Sexual Exploitation in Japan, which takes a similar stance to the TIP Report and 
also highlights Japan as a destination country for trafficked persons and explains that the 
majority of the victims are trafficked into Japan's sex and entertainment industry with indication 
that some victims to these traffickers are minors (International Labor Organization 2005: 2). 
Working with NGOs in Japan who help trafficking victims and victims of sexual exploitation, 
this report aims to depict the nature of human trafficking in Japan through stories of former 
victims. The ILO also presents statistics from the Japanese National Police Agency, HELP 
Asian Women's Shelter, and the Japanese Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau, amongst 
others. 
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One such example of the narrative-like stories presented in this document, is that of 
"Margarita", a twenty year old Filipina. women who was illegally recruited for work in Japan and 
was "promise work in a restaurant or bar." The report states that: 
When Margarita arrived in Japan, her ticket, passport and show money were 
removed and she was told she had a debt of250,000 yen. Margarita was forced to 
work as a hostess and sex worker ..... Margarita was threatened and experienced 
both physical and sexual violence from traffickers and employers in Japan 
(International Labor Organization 2005: 29). 
The case ofMargarita depicts the dangerous and abusive conditions suffered by trafficking 
victims which migrants are susceptible to as undocumented workers in Japan. It depicts real-life 
experiences of the exploitative conditions which traffickers subject vulnerable women to in this 
process. 
The stories of Sri and Suoy portray some of the methods traffickers utilize to facilitate the 
entry ofwomen into Japan: 
Sri applied for a passport herself, but was called to an office to meet a 'boss' who 
had many passports at hand and chose one for her. She had silicone injections in 
her face to make her look more like the picture on the passport (International 
Labor Organization 2005: 19). 
Suoy met Jun [her trafficker] at Don Muang airport, Bangkok, in March 2002 and 
they travelled together to Japan through Soiht Korea. When they left Bangkok, 
the authorities questiond her on her visa, asking whether it was real. Jun left the 
room with the authorities, and when he came back her passport was sampled. 
When they arrived in Japan, Suoy noticed that Jun showed another passport to 
Immigration (International Labor Organization 2005: 19-20). 
These trafficking methods are not novel nor are they unique to Japan. This demonstrates that 
typical scenarios ofhuman trafficking play out in the realities of the women trafficked into 
Japan's sex industry. Such strategies of traffickers are also highlighted by various others as well 
(Anderson and Andrijasevic 2008; Bales 2004,2008; Mahdavi 2011). False documentation and 
corrupt officials are a crucial component necessary to facilitate the trafficking process. Since 
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much of their movement occurs in the clear visibility of law enforcement and border officials, it 
is essential for the traffickers to take necessary steps in bribing corrupt officials and obtaining 
falsified documentation to ensure successful entry of the trafficked person into Japan (or any 
destination country). 
I 
The story of "Maria" exemplifies the use of fear which trafficking instills in their victims 
to ensure that they women they traffic do not attempt escape: "trafficking group members visited 
[Maria's] family in Colombia, threatening her mother and six year old child with guns, 
threatening her that if she did not pay her debt, they would return and harm them" (International 
Labor Organization 2005: 11). Here is an example of another common technique used by 
traffickers to ensure that victims to not escape or attempt escape. By familiarizing themselves 
i! 
with the victim's family situation in their origin country, they can use the threat of violence 
against the victim's family to hold them in such exploitative conditions. Victims may be more 1 
willing to risk their own life than the lives of their children or relatives, and such experiences 1 
explain the trafficker's proximity to the victim's loved-ones back in their home country. This is 
I 
1 
I 
again, neither unique nor particular to Japan, as other authors have highlighted, this technique 
used to ensure that victims do not try to flee their conditions around the world. 
Aside from these personal stories ofhuman trafficking experiences, this report also 
I 
explains some of the responses to human trafficking at the local level. Local governments in 
Chiba and Hyogo have taken several steps within their geographical jurisdiction to take further 
steps to combat human trafficking and labor exploitation. In addition, the report also goes into 
detail into the actions ofthree NGOs: HELP, House ofWomen SAALAA, and Japan Network 
Against Trafficking in Persons, and their respective actions to address human trafficking, provide 
support to trafficking victims, and working with authorities to reduce the number of trafficked 
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persons into Japan. Because of Japan's Hlukewarm" approach to human trafficking issues, 
NGOs have played a significant role in rehabilitating victims and making progress in the fight 
against traffickers in Japan (International Labor Organization 2005: 67 -70). 
The significance ofHuman Trafficking/or Sexual Slavery in Japan is that it draws 
attention to these issues using specific cases of human trafficking victims. The stories and 
experiences of these women function to validate the claims ofhuman trafficking in Japan echoed 
elsewhere by associating a name to the stories to express and define the abusive and exploitation 
imposed by traffickers. While this is just a brief and somewhat generalized portrayal of the 
situation, it emphasizes the realities victims face in Japan and highlights the need to administer 
more attention to issues of human trafficking and labor exploitation in Japan. 
2.1.c United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
In 2006 and 2012 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) issued two 
reports which elaborated on the situation of human trafficking in their respective periods. In 
2006, the report Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns, indicated Japan was a country with a 
"very low" level of incidence as a source country, although they were indicated as a country with 
a "very high" level of incidence as a destination country. 
The 2012 report, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, again recognized Japan as a 
destination country for trafficked persons. The report makes not of several novel facts that were 
not indicated on the 2006 report such as the low correlation between number of girls identified as 
victims and the number ofpersons prosecuted for trafficking women into sexual slavery, the 
higher percentage of Japanese nationals convicted for trafficking offenses (in relation to 
foreigners), and the fact that Japan did report the identification of male victims during the 
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reporting period of 2007 - 2010. This report also reiterated nationals from specific countries 
who had been discovered as victims of human trafficking in Japan (particularly from Thailand 
and Philippines) and stated that more adults than children were trafficked into Japan over the 
corresponding reporting period. 
2.2. Interpretations of Human Trafficking 
Government agencies provide a source for data in an international comparative 
perspective. While these bodies are resourceful in depicting the situation of human trafficking, 
at the same time they are a source drawn upon and critiqued by scholars for their representations 
and misrepresentations of their largely empirical analysis. Scholars have indicated problems 
with the methodological framework utilized by governing bodies in their analysis. This section 
will present a brief analysis on how scholars other scholars have analyzed and interpreted the 
findings put forth by governmental organizations - both showing a sense of correspondence 
between these findings, in addition to criticizing these findings for their lack of practicality. 
2.2.a. Abuse and Exploitation 
The reports by governmental organizations have made significant efforts to accentuate 
the abuses and severe human rights violations which are experienced by trafficking victims 
during their captivity. These exploitative and abusive conditions have also been the focal point 
ofmuch scholarly analysis from authors who have elaborated on conditions ofhuman trafficking 
in Japan. 
In an interview with Ms. Rutsuko Shoji, of Japans Women's Christian Temperance 
Union an organization which helps women in distress, Shoji explained the shifting trajectories of 
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I 
hwnan trafficking throughout the past three decades. Shoji states how in the 1980s she found her 
organization assisting a high nwnber ofFilipino victims; in the 1990s, Thai victims were more 
notable; the 2000s saw a higher increase in the number of South American women who her 
organization reached out to (Shoji 2005). These groups ofmigrant women - making up a 
significant bulk of recognized trafficking victims in Japan - have received attention from many 
others. Pataya Ruenkaew (2002) portrays the abuses suffered by migrant Thai women. As a 
result ofa lack of legal channels for migration, Thai women seek out third parties to facilitate 
their migration, which in turn results in their increased vulnerability to exploitation (Ruenkaew 
2002). Kinsey Alden Dinan (2002) uses more specified narratives ofThai women who have 
been subjected to such abuse to show the severity of the experiences faced by Thai women in 
Japan. Although some Thai women have knowledge they will be engaging in sex work and 
understand the parameters of debt-bondage they will be subjected to, they are often unaware that 
they will be treated as property and abused. Dinan states that: 
For trafficked women, the job placement negotiations often provide the first clear sign of 
slavery-like nature of their situation. Most women trafficking from Thailand ... are traded 
by broekrs to owners or managers of "dating" or baishin (prostitution) snack 
bars...trafficking women have no opportunity to negotiate their contract nor any ability to 
select or refuse their payment (Dinan 2002: 1120) 
For the case of Filipino migrant women, this lack of legal channels for migration has 
been indicated by Randolf S. David (1992) and Rhacel Salazar Parrefias (2011), who explain that 
this precise lack oflegal channels for migration has forced Filipino migrants (particularly women) 
to tum to illicit third parties to facilitate entry into Japan. Nicola Piper (1999) again reiterates 
this movement of Filipino workers into Japan who suffer abuse and exploitative conditions, 
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particularly under the guide of the entertainer visa. However, this is somewhat conflicting with 
Parrefias' thesis that Filipina entertainers are not synonymous with sex workers and that by 
working to hinder the migration of these Filipinas who want to migrate to Japan universally 
would compromise efforts to prevent trafficking as this merely would sever the means to such 
migration but not necessarily decrease the demand of such migration (Parrefias 2011). 
2.2.h Infringement of Rights 
While all sources recognize the seriousness and severity ofhuman trafficking, scholars 
have also indicated that haphazardly produced legislation and an unawareness of the actual 
situation that is carried out in practice can actually infringe upon the rights of migrants and be 
counter-productive to stopping human trafficking. In particular, government's application of the 
recommendations contained in the TIP Report has often led to such circumstances. 
Parrefias argues that for the situation ofFilipina migrant hostesses in Japan "free and 
slave fail to capture the complexity of the Filipina's situation" (Parrefias 2011: 6). By this 
statement, Parrefias makes the point that many Filipina migrant hostesses, who the TIP Report 
has identified as a population who suffers from high levels ofhuman trafficking, are actually 
agents migrating under their own accord and are knowledgeable of the situation they will 
encounter working in Japan (Parrefias 2011). Although, Parrefias does not neglect to recognize 
the exploitation these women face, they are on the other hand choosing to migrate to Japan 
because it is more lucrative and actually safer and more preferred than migrating to countries say 
in the Middle East to preform domestic service (ibid.). 
Parrefias asserts that classifying these migrants as victims of sex trafficking would be a 
severe misinterpretation of the conditions ofmigrations. However, this is precisely what Japan 
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has done and implemented policies which have taken these migrant populations as sex trafficked 
victims. Japan was classified by the TIP Report in 2004 as a Tier 2 Watch List country and as a 
response Japan enacted a series of legislations which intended to reduce human trafficking into 
the country. One of dimension of such legislations was to reduce the number of entertainer visas 
issued in an effort to reduce the number ofwomen who were exploited under the guise of such 
visa. As a result, Parrefias has remained critical of the TIP Report and its findings and argues 
that these women have been inappropriately classified as victims when they are in fact agents of 
their own migration. These women are vulnerable to exploitation, but not in the sense that the 
TIP Report has described, and making such assumptions have further increased their potential 
vulnerability. Pardis Mahdavi has noted similar conditions in the United Arab Emirates, where 
after a Tier 3 classification on the TIP Report, which led to a global embarrassment and 
international marginalization, enacted haphazard trafficking policies which were counter­
productive to stopping human trafficking and migration (Mahdavi 2011). Parrefias and Mahdavi 
emphasize the importance for governments who are in the position of Japan to approach human 
trafficking protocol with more consciousness to what is happening on the ground. 
The TIP Report has also drawn criticism from other arenas as well. Amy Friedrich, Anna 
Meyer, and Deborah Perlman have also drawn the correlation between the tier classifications of 
the TIP Report and foreign government policy (Friedrich et al. 2006). Their article "The 
Trafficking in Persons Report: Strengthening a Diplomatic Tool" pays particular attention to how 
the TIP Report has been used to influence foreign government trafficking policy, specifically 
referencing the case of Filipinas and the 2005 legislation by Japan (Friedrich et al. 2006: 12 - 13). 
The authors present a critical look at the report and emphasize the ambiguous efficiency of the 
proclamations within the report, the inconsistent and unclear analyzation process, and how the 
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report can lead to negative repercussions for foreign governments and potential migrants 
(Friedrich et. al 2006). The article also postulates suggestions as to where the report can improve 
in the future. 
Similarly, Ayia Weiss also explains how "the U.S. Department of State must make major 
changes to the TIP Report's methodology by modifying its standards and tailoring its analysis to 
each country's specific situation" (Weiss 2012: 305). Weiss uses the case of South Korea as 
example of the TIP Report's inconsistency and ineptitudes in accurately classifying nations 
within the tier system. South Korea was classified as a Tier 3 country in 2001 and, like Japan, 
was humiliated in the international sphere (Weiss 2012). In 2002, South Korea was increased to 
a Tier 1 country. South Korea implemented some legislative action and Weiss describes that 
"these changes reflect a shift in South Korea's attitude towards trafficking ...." (ibid.). South 
Korea was given this ranking despite the fact that South Korea still did not implement adequate 
changes to their protocol and was still not in compliance with the regulations set out by the 
TVPA. 
Nevertheless, because this report is the most consistent source of universal analysis of 
human trafficking globally, the contents of this report still warrant considerable consideration. 
Although the methodology of this report, as well as its contents may be called into question, it 
still provides consistent benchmarks through which human trafficking in a given country can be 
further evaluated and investigated. 
Feminist protectionist models of anti-trafficking legislation have led to discourse on 
trafficking that has undermined the desires ofmigrants who seek work in the sex or 
entertainment sectors. Similar to Parrefias and Mahdavi, Rutvica Andrijasevic (2008; and 
Anderson 2008) also highlights that women in Eastern European countries consciously migrate 
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to West Europe to engage in sex work. Accordingly, legislative framework which has not 
recognized the aspirations of these women provides dubious polices which fail to recognize the 
true intentions of these migrant women. 
2.2.c. Japan, Cultural Relativism, and Human Trafficking 
Cultural relativism is a theoretical philosophy which situates the values and practices of a 
particular society in the context of the society itself. Discussions about cultural relativism are 
often related to issues of human rights juxtapose the preservation of traditional societal values. 
For example, Ali Mazrui (1999) explains how cultural relativism provides different collective 
interpretations and responses to one specific event. These interpretations and responses are 
based on the value judgments and criteria of analysis within a particular society.5 Authors have 
accordingly not eschewed relating concepts of cultural relativism to Japanese society. For 
example, Japan's immigration policy in the late 20th and early 21 st century brought to the 
attention the conflict between protecting the rights of migrants and respecting notions of 
Japanese culture (Yamaga-Karns 1995), the Japanese governments role in dictating cultural 
norms of groupism Japanese people based on government-centered ideologies (Marfording 1997), 
and how traditional culture ideologies of cultural relativism in East Asia, particularly Japan, have 
played a role in the modernization and nation-building process. 
Muhammed Enes Kala notes that cultural relativism has been unconsciously appropriated 
since ancient times and divides cultural relativism into two categories: normative cultural 
S Mazrui uses the example of the former United States President Bill Clinton's affair with Monica 
Lewinsky. Mazrui makes notice that whereas Americans explained that the act of lying under oath 
garnered greater belittlement and censure from the general public, Muslims and Muslim-Americans saw 
the act of adultery - which in some societies is punishable by death - as a much more significant offense. 
This interpretation is based on the different values a particular society places on certain actions. 
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relativism and descriptive cultural relativism (Kala 2011: 203; 206). Kala describes that 
"descriptive cultural relativism is based on empirical observations in varied societies." (ibid.) 
This category considers localizes values and ethnics to respective societies in order to achieve a 
deeper understanding and so to avoid drawing misleading conclusions. Nonnative cultural 
relativism, on the other hand, "claims 'it is wrong to pass judgment on others who have 
substantially different values, or to try to make them confonn to one's values, for the reason that 
their values are as valid as one's own. '" (ibid.) Essentially, nonnative cultural relativism retains 
that "people ought to comply with the moral nonns and judgments of one's own culture" (Kara 
2011: 207). The dichotomy lies in the way one approaches cultural relativism and how values 
and ethnics of a particular society should be interpreted. 
Issues of cultural relativism in the context of Japan have surfaced in issues of Japanese 
immigration policies in the late 20th and early 21 st century. Kevin Yamaga-Karns notes that 
"while Japan should not be allowed to use its "unique culture" as an excuse to avoid 
implementing changes, broad refonn and acceptance ofmigrant labor into Japanese society are 
unlikely ifpressed upon its members unwillingly" and that "Japan's extreme sensitivity to its 
image in the world community, due in part to a historical competitiveness with the West and in 
part to its export-dominated economy, and has suggested using this as leverage in applying 
international pressure upon Japan to refonn its policies regarding illegal migrant labor" 
(Yamaga-Karns 1995). The issue on what extent Japan should adopt and enact international 
nonns pertaining to human rights ofmigrants into their immigmtion policy is a simple and 
complex issue. Demands that Japan adapt international rights models accordingly often neglect 
to recognize the cultural relativity of Japanese society; at the same time Japan's own ideas of 
society can prove detrimental to migrants as they are denied internationally recognized rights. 
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Therefore, there must be established a balance between respecting Japan's culture norms, while 
also ensuring the protection of the rights ofmigrants. 
Japan has long been a society centered around cultural groupism, and group harmony is 
one of the defining aspects of nihonjinron (Befu 2001; Marfording 1997).6 Annette Marfording 
suggests that "even though Japanese government leaders do not officially advocate cultural 
relativism at international human rights forums as many of their Asian counterparts do, 
the nihonjinron literature could be used to argue that individual-based human rights provisions 
are inapplicable to Japan as a group-based society." (Marfording 1997: 433) However, 
Marfording argues that when appropriating cultural relativism it must be made to ensure that 
culture is truly the culture of the people, rather than an artificially socio-politically instilled 
culture (ibid.). Marfording raises numerous instances from the Tokugawa to the postwar eras 
where government officials had dictated notions ofculture to the Japanese people. Such 
historical imposition of rights raises questions as to whether modern Japanese perspectives of 
cultural relativism are truly the cultural norms of the masses or whether they too have been 
dictated and imposed by those in power.7 
The insights written by Yamaga-Karns and Marfording were published in 1995 and 1997 
respectively; nearly twenty years earlier and several years before human trafficking began to 
galvanize significant international and activist input. I argue that Japan's cultural relativism can 
be utilized as a means to comprehend the nation's subpar human trafficking policies which, 
6 Nihonjinron can be translated as the "unique characteristics ofthe Japanese." It is a deeply rooted and 
complex concept which has taken up a variety of different forms at uses at different points in history but it 
has overall generally focused on what makes the Japanese a distinct ethno-racial group. 
7 Marfording does make note, that at the time of pUblication (1997), Japanese youth were standing up 
more to Japanese oppressive societal norms than at any other time historically and have begun to 
approach issues with a more rights-centered focus. 
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despite making some strides in the mid-2000s, have overall remained inefficient in stopping this 
phenomenon. Appropriating cultural norms - either truly representative of the masses or 
government imposed - have influenced Japan's human trafficking agenda and have to some 
extent been responsible for the nonchalant attitude demonstrated by Japan. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGISLATIONS IMPLEMENTED BY JAPAN, DATA, AND ANALYSIS 
3.1. Legislative Background 
Japan was classified by the U.S. TIP Report as a Tier 2 Watch List country in 2004. 
Since this classification was received as an international humiliation for Japan, the Japanese 
government enacted a series of revisions to their Penal Code and Immigration Control and 
Refugee Recognition Act which were intended to curb human trafficking and adequately address 
the problems highlighted in the TIP Report. As of2013, these remain the most comprehensive 
piece of legislative actions taken by Japan intending to take aim at the country's human 
trafficking problem. This chapter will explain what these legislative actions were and will also 
present data on various relevant fields ofhuman trafficking and migration into Japan in an effort 
to explain how these legislations have impacted migratory trends into Japan. Consequently, one 
apparent idea is that the Japanese revisions have been administered with a "third world bias" in 
which nationals from developing and transitioning countries have been impacted more severely 
by these legislations than nationals from developed countries. 
To understand these legislations in a larger context, in 2000 the United Nations adopted 
the "Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime (Palermo 
Protocol)."g This protocol aimed to address a number of issues but primarily focuses on I) 
clearly established an internationally standardized recognition for trafficking persons, 2) 
guaranteed more significant protection of trafficking victims which included protection from 
g This document can be accessed here: http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/trafficking.html. 
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imprisonment or deportation 3) further extending protection of children who have been victims 
or trafficking 4) grant privileges to trafficking victims in the country in which they were 
exploited, and 5) assured harsher penalties for individuals convicted of trafficking in persons. 
Japan established the Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee and the Anti-Trafficking Task 
Force consisting of"the Cabinet Secretariat; Cabinet Office; National Police Agency; Ministry 
of Justice; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry ofHealth, Labor, and Welfare" (Japan 
Ministry of Affairs 2007; Kondo 2011). This Anti-Trafficking Task Force produced the National 
Action Plan ofMeasures to Combat Trafficking in Persons in December of 2004, which then led 
to revisions to Japan's Penal Code, Law on the Control and Improvement of Amusement and 
Business, and Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 2005. These amendments 
were intended to improve their human trafficking situation, bring themselves into compliance 
with the Palermo Protocol, and redeem themselves from their 2004 TIP Report classification. 
Kondo notes the following as the key elements of the changes brought about by the 2005 
legislative actions include: 
Article 225: Kidnappingfor "threat to life or body'! 
Revised to now included kidnapping for the purposes of organ removal and 
criminalized the act of removing the organs due to "threat to life or body" rather 
than the act of removing organs for economic gain (Kondo 2011: 220) 
Article 226-2 Crime ofbuying or selling human beings 
Changed to include "giving or receiving ofpayments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person" (ibid.) 

Article 226-3 Transport ofKidnapped Persons. 

Changed to include the act of transporting kidnapped persons into Japan. 

Previously it had only dealt with the transport of kidnapped persons out of Japan 

(Kondo 2011: 221) 

Article 227: Transfer ofKidnapped Persons. 
Changed to include the act of transfer of kidnapped persons. Previously only 
dealt with procuring, receipt, or harboring (ibid). 
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Article 10-1, Article 11: Cpncealment ofcrime proceeds. 

Changed to include money laundering ofhuman trafficking profits (ibid.) 

Article 157-4: Examination ofwitness through a video link system. 
Trafficking victims were now included in the persons eligible for use of the video 
link system. This system allows for victims to conduct interviews outside the 
courtroom and was intended to ease the psychological difficulties for victims of 
sex crimes (Kondo 2011: 222) 
In addition there were also revisions which were made to Japan's Law on the Control and 
Improvement ofAmusement Business in 2005 which included: 
Article 4-1-2: Human traffickingjustifies revoking business permits and business 
suspension. Any establishment where human trafficking was discovered to be 
occurring, this establishment could have their business permits revoked or 
suspended, thus not allowing this business to legally operate hereafter (ibid.) 
Article 36-2: Owners must verify immigration status andproper age offoreign 
employees. Any establishment employing foreign workers must verify that these 
employees are of proper visa status and are of legal age for work in such industry 
(ibid.) 
Along with these revisions to the Penal Code and Law on the Control and Improvement of 
Amusement and Business Act, further regulations include revisions to the Immigration Control 
and Refugee Recognition Act. The following are such revisions: 
Article 24-4-c: Trafficking offenders can be deported from Japan. 
Laws stated that offenders of trafficking will be considered for expulsion from 
Japan (ibid.) 
Article 5-1-7-2: Trafficking offenders can be denied entry into Japan. 

Persons who have been recognized as human traffickers and offenders can be 

denied entry into Japan upon arrival (ibid.) 

Article 50-1-3: Ministry ofJustice can grant special residence permission to 
victims oftrafficking who entered Japan "under control ofanother due to 
trafficking in persons. " 
Victims are eligible to obtain special residence permission which would allow 
them to stay in Japan for months without having to worry about legal status (ibid.) 
Article 12-1-2: Ministry ofJustice can grant special landing permission to victims 
who trafficking who entered Japan "under control ofanother due to trafficking in 
persons. 
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Those who arrived in Japan by means other than their own accord are eligible to 
obtain special landing pennission which allows them to remain legally in Japan 
without risk of penalty (ibid.) 
These revisions were intended to decriminalize the victim, ensure victims were not held 
responsible for their action or their violations of Japanese law while under trafficker's control, 
and to further criminalize the traffickers responsible for the captivity and exploitation of these 
victims. 
3.2. Stricter Regulations of the Entertainer Visa 
In 2005 the Japanese government also amended their criteria for the eligibility to obtain 
Japan's entertainer visa. This visa allows individuals to enter Japan for the purposes of 
"entertainment," which includes but is not limited to acts such as singing, dancing, perfonning, 
etc. It has been noted that many acknowledged trafficking victims had entered Japan on this 
entertainer visa (International Labor Organization 2005; U.S. Department of State). In an effort 
to reduce the number of individuals exploited by means of this visa, the Japanese government 
restructured their qualification criteria for obtaining this particular visa. As of 2005, in order to 
receive an entertainer visa, one must have spent a minimum of two years of training or 
"experience relevant to the specified type ofperfonnance." Therefore, in order to be eligible for 
an entertainer visa, one must have completed at least two years of training in their respective art 
of entertainment. This new regulation was introduced with the intention to make it more difficult 
for traffickers to exploit victims through this visa status. 
In an pamphlet issued by Japan in 2007 written in English, the Japanese Ministry of 
Justice cites this decrease in number ofentertainer visas issues as an assertive action taken by 
Japan in the fight against human trafficking since 2005 (Japanese Ministry of Justice 2007). The 
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pamphlet also accentuates the 2005 revisions and other relatively miniscule provisions Japan has 
since taken in attempt to address human trafficking. This appears to represent self-promotion of 
would be reforms that Parrefias describes as hindering migration mobility and autonomy. Such 
contradiction is perfectly exemplar ofthe ambivalence, complexity, and validation that research 
and attention needs to be administered in order to more accurately understand the severity and 
realistic parameters surrounding human trafficking in Japan. 
3.3. Later Actions 
In 2009, the Anti-Trafficking Task Force launched a "New National Action Plan" to 
address human trafficking which intended to further strengthen the anti-trafficking protocol 
within Japan and build on the 2005 revisions. The New National Action Plan included a "Public 
Awareness Roadmap" which involved the distribution of 33,000 posters and 50,000 leaflets 
designed to raise awareness of human trafficking throughout Japan (U.S. Department of State 
2010,2011). There were also enhanced efforts to train law enforcement officials which included 
a ten page manual that contained ways to identify and engage potential cases of trafficking in 
persons. Japan has also provided annual financial assistance to victim help services within Japan, 
as well as provide financial assistance in the form of grants to the International Organization for 
Migration to repatriate and rehabilitate victims (U.S. Department of State 2011). In a similar 
initiative, the Japanese Immigration Bureau enacted an online awareness campaign to raise 
awareness ofhuman trafficking and other labor exploitation issues. 
Despite such efforts, there has been no indication that these actions have been at all 
efficient in curbing human trafficking. NOOs such as ECPAT International and the U.S. 
Department of State, amongst others, have remained highly critical of Japan's efforts, as the 
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distribution of the leaflets and posters in 2009 was seemingly done in a haphazard manner. It has 
been noted that most individuals who received such information were highly unlikely to ever 
come across or be in a position to potentially recognize a victim ofhuman trafficking (U.S. 
Department of State 2011). In addition, it is also unclear as to whether the manuals distributed to 
government agencies were actually responsible for the identification and/or rescue ofany human 
trafficking victims (U.S. Department of State 2011). 
The "Law of Partial Amendment to the Immigrant Control and Refugee Recognition Act 
and the Special Act on the Immigration Control of, Inter alia, Those who have Lost Japanese 
Nationality Pursuant to the Treaty of Peace with Japan" was implemented in 2009.9 This order 
had various implications on the migration process which are in effect related to human 
trafficking. This particular piece of legislation had implications for on the overall number of 
"Trainee" visas which had been issued. As described by the Ministry of Justice: 
The number of newly entering foreign nationals with status of "Trainee" decreased by 
28,755 (35.7%) from a year earlier to 51,725 in 2010. The decrease is considered to be 
due to a new training/technical intern training program that started on July 1, 2010, 
following '~he Law ofpartial Amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act and the Special Act on the Immigration Control of, Inter Alia, Those 
who have Lost Japanese Nationality Pursuant to the Treat of Peace with Japan" enacted 
in July, 2009, along with which the status ofresidence of"Trainee" is to be issued only 
for those engaged in a training not related to practical business or an official training. 
Those engaged in the acquisition ofknowledge through lectures or the acquisition of 
skills through employment are issued the status of residence "of"Technical Intern 
Training 1" (Japanese Ministry of Justice 2011). 
The report also makes note to mention that: 
9tl::LAOO~JJI!&tJjI~~:Q:i':t~ s*00 ~ O)¥fD~K8{;:£---5~ S*O)OOftHd~tJBt ~t:.*~ 
O)tl::lAOO~JJI!~;:~T Q~{?Uj~ (shutsunyukokukanri oyobi nanminninteiho to nihonkoku tonG 
heiwajoyaku ni motozuki nihon no kokuseki wo ridatsushitamonotou no shutsunyukokukanri ni 
kansuru tokureiho). 
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According to statistics by region, the number of Asian trainees reached 46,161 in 2010 
and accounted for 89.2% of the total. This is because Asian nations, particularly Japan's 
neighboring countries, are very eager to send their students to Japan as trainees. This 
upward trend is expected to continue on account of the close relations between Asian 
countries and Japan in various fields. In addition ... Africa sent 2,206 (4.3%) 
trainees ...while Latin America also dispatched 1,200 (2.3%). (Japanese Ministry of 
Justice 2011) 
Here the Japanese government makes a distinction between trainees as a broader category 
and trainees entering to engage in the Technical Internship and Industrial Trainee Program. 
According to the Japanese International Training Cooperation Organization: 10 
There is a need to provide training in technical skills, technology, knowledge from 
developed countries (hereinafter, referred to as "Skills") in order to train personnel who 
will become the foundation ofeconomic and industrial development in developing 
countries. In an effort to address this situation, the Japanese government has created the 
"Technical Intern Training Program", an initiative that provides training for a specific 
period in industrial society to both youth and adult workers from all countries (Japanese 
International Training Cooperation Organization) 
This new categorization and dichotomy designates a specific visa category for those 
individuals engaging in the Technical Internship and Industrial Trainee Program. This 
distinguishes these "technical interns" from "trainees" which include government, academic, and 
political trainees (Japanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs).ll 
This new categorization and dichotomy of the trainee visa status is an attempt to 
differentiate categories of trainees. Certain criteria have been established to distinguish 
eligibility on certain categories. While not explicitly states, the TIP Report in 2012 postulates: 
The Government of Japan has not officially recognized the existence of forced labor 
within the Industrial Trainee and Technical Internship Program, a government.run 
program designed to foster basic industrial skills and techniques and to provide 
)0 Obtained from Japan International Training Cooperation Organization'S webpage. Direct link: 
http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/itp/index.html. 
II Obtained from Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' webpage. Direct link: 

http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visitlvisallong/index.html. 
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opportunity to acquire practical skills and techniques. However, the government made a 
number ofefforts to address labor issues in the program (U.S. Department of State 2012: 
199) 
The report explains the brokering of Chinese interns who have been exploited and subjected to 
abusive conditions of debt-bondage within this program, and states "Although banned since 2010, 
these [fees, deposits, and "punishment" contracts through which interns are exploited and held in 
debt-bondage] continue to be prevalent for Chinese participants in the program" (U.S. 
Department of State 2012: 199). Whether or not these revisions are what the TIP Report was 
inferring to is unclear. However, the amendments put forward in "The Law of Partial 
Amendment to the Immigrant Control and Refugee Recognition Act and the Special Act on the 
Immigration Control of, Inter alia, Those who have Lost Japanese Nationality Pursuant to the 
Treaty ofPeace with Japan" have certainly impacted migratory trends in the distribution of the 
trainee visa. 
3.4. Data Presentation 
In order to contextualize the effects of these reforms, the following statistics will 
demonstrate the implications these reforms have had on various aspects of the migration process 
into Japan. It is important to remember that these statistics only portray the numbers that are 
officially recognized and do not factor in what occurs out ofpublic view. Due to the clandestine 
and illicit nature ofhuman trafficking and illegal aspects of third part migration, many victims of 
trafficking and undocumented migrants are not factored into these official statistics. Many 
victims have yet to be identified nor are authorities capable of estimating accurately the number 
of illegal migrants or forced workers. Therefore, these numbers are not to be used as a means to 
accurately represent the situation, but rather as a means to gauge what occurs behind closed 
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doors. While such data is by no means used to explicate reality, their significance is not obsolete 
either. Such statistics can be used to identify trends in Japan's human trafficking situation over 
time also contextualize changes that have occurred through various aspects of the trafficking 
process. 
The following two tables depict the overall number of foreign nationals entering Japan 
since 1955 and the overall number of registered foreign nationals in Japan. Table 1 shows the 
Changes in the overall number of foreign nationals entering Japan and Table 2 shows the 
changes in the number of registered foreign nationals and its percentage of the total population in 
Japan. 
Overall Foreign Nationals Entering Japan 
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Table 2. Changes in the Number of Registered Foreign Nationals and its Percentage of the Total 
Pl' . Jopu atlOn In apan 
YEAR NUMBER %OFPOP 
. 
1955 641,482 .71 I 
1960 650,566 .69 . 
1965 665,989 .67 
1970 708,458 .68 
1975 751,842 .67 
1980 782,910 .67 
1985 859,612 .70 
1990 1,075,317 .87 
1,362,371 1.081995 
1,686,444 1.33.2000 
12005 2,011,555 1.57 
1.632,084,919.2006 
2,152,973 1.692007 
1.742008 2,217,426 
1.712,186,1212009 
1.672,134,1512010 
1.632,078,5082011 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice 2012 
Both of these Tables demonstrate a consistent increase in both number of foreigners registered 
and number of foreigners entering Japan from 1955 until the latter half 0 f the first decade of the 
21 st century. The overall number of foreigners entering Japan peaked in 2007 at 9,152,186 and 
has remained in a period ofconstant oscillation since then. The overall number of registered 
foreigners in Japan peaked in 2008 with 2,217,426 overall registered foreigners accounting for 
1.74% of Japan's total population and has steadily been decreasing since. The Japanese Ministry 
of Justice explains that "the primary factor as to why the number ofnew entrants dropped 
sharply is considered to be the prolonged [depreciation] of the yen, in addition to the Great East 
Japan Earthquake and the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant" (Japanese 
Ministry ofJustice 2012). 
36 

In relation to the 2005 legislations, the overall trends of migration into Japan did not 
decrease directly after these legislations were implemented. Rather, the decreased in foreigners 
registered in Japan and those entering Japan occurred several years after the 2005 legislations 
and it is postulated these decreases occurred for factors unrelated to human trafficking or labor 
exploitation. In a greater context, this demonstrates that migration into Japan was not universally 
hindered as a result of these legislations. However, certain groups of immigrants have been 
disproportionally impacted by the ramifications of these legislations, as will be depicted through 
analyzing the following Tables. 
iT ..all R . dHTable 3 0 vera11 OffiICI y ecogmze uman TraffiICking V"Icbms b Country 0 fO'ngm 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Thailand 73 39 40 21 48 21 3 4 18 8 12 287 
Philippin 4 12 2 13 40 30 22 7 4 24 8 166 
Indonesia 3 4 3 44 14 11 79 
Colombia 1 3 6 43 5 1 59 
Taiwan 3 7 3 12 5 4 10 5 1 1 51 
Japan 1 2 2 12 4 21 
China 7 4 2 1 14 
Russia 12 2 14 
S,Korea 1 3 1 1 5 1 11 
Romania 4 4 
Others 2 1 3 2 2 2 
Total 104 65 55 83 77 117 58 43 36 18 37 25 666 
Source: Japanese National Police Agency 2012 
Table 3 shows the overall number of recognized human trafficking victims based on country of 
origin since 2000. The data shows that the peak of the overall number of recognized human 
trafficking victims occurred in 2005 where there were 117 recognized victims. The following 
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year, the overall number of human trafficking victims had decreased to 58, and in 2007, the 
numbers further decreased to 43. In 2008, the official number of victims decreased to 36, and in 
2009, the officially recognized victims reached a decade low at 18. 
Prior to the 2005 revisions Japan was harshly criticized for their lackluster efforts to 
address their human trafficking problem which included their ineptitude to rescue victims of 
trafficking from exploitative conditions and to arrest and prosecute trafficking offenders. If 
Japan was serious about their efforts to eradicate human trafficking the number of recognized 
victims in subsequent years would have increased. Since Japan was perceived as not doing an 
efficient job prior to 2005, heightened efforts would have included more engagement to rescue 
victims from such exploitative conditions and ensure their captors are brought to justice. 
However, in subsequent years the overall number of officially recognized victims had steadily 
decreased (from 117 in 2005 down to 18 in 2009), thus exemplifying their perpetual indifference 
towards human trafficking. Despite administering potentially innovative policies which could 
have functioned to decrease human trafficking flows and liberate victims, analyzing the 
statistical figures work to display the deficiency of such policies. 
Table 4 shows the overall numbers of "entertainers" entering Japan from 2001 - 2011. 
The number of entertainers entering Japan peaked in 2004 with 134,879. The following year the 
numbers of entertainers entering took a substantial decreased, dropping down to 99,342. In 2006, 
an even more significant decrease occurred when entertainers entering Japan fell to 48,249. 
Those entering Japan on an entertainer visa has been steadily declining ever since. 
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Table 4. Overall Entertainers Enterin Ja an 2001 - 2011 
Overall Entertainers Entering Japan 
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Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice 2012 
llEtrt' E t' apan bet)y fO"n.gm 2001 2011Table 5 0 vera ne amers nenng J oumryo 
Year Total Phil USA UK China Russia Germ France Italy S.Korea Indonesia Ukraine Romania 
• 2001 117,839 71,678 6,488 2,956 3,730 4,944 1,527 2,991 1,545 4,030 
2002 123,322 74,729 6,887 2,854 5,670 5,068 1,625 2,519 2,176 4,710 
• 2003 133,103 82,048 7,066 2,724 6,486 6,240 1,749 2,184 2,447 2,585 4,871 
• 2004 134,879 82,741 6,704 2,665 8,277 5,775 1,750 2,141 3,012 2,219 4,500 
2005 99,342 47,765 6,852 2,763 8,263 4,325 2,435 I 1,954 4,086 1,783 3,201 
2006 48,249 8,608 6,772 2,712 4,978 3,454 1,868 1,150 1,867 1,674 1,532 1,155 
i 2007 38,855 5,533 6,075 2,500 3,156 2,562 2,052 1,417 1,575 1,553 608 972 
• 2008 34,994 3,185 6,653 2,908 1,820 2,249 1,682 1,605 1,130 1,329 
2009 31,170 1,873 7,288 2,575 1,694 2,467 1,601 1,246 1,325 1,173 
2010 28,612 1,506 6,785 3,009 1,386 1,432 1,241 1,116 1,105 1,450 
2011 26,112 1,407 5,908 2,474 739 1,452 1,358 780 1,205 3,179 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice 2012 
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Table 5 shows the number of individuals entering Japan on an entertainer visa by country of 
origin from 2003 - 2011. 12 The number of entertainers entering Japan peaked in 2004 at 134,879. 
Following 2004 the number has steadily decreased in subsequent years. Philippine-nationals 
entering Japan peaked in 2004 with 82,741 and has continually decreased until reaching 1,407 in 
2011. Individuals from China entering Japan on entertainer visas also saw a similar trend. 
Peaking in 2004, Chinese nationals arriving in Japan on entertainer visas consistently decreased 
since then and in 2011 had just 739 nationals entering Japan on entertainer visas. Russian-
nationals entering Japan on entertainer visas peaked in 2003 with 6,240 and steadily declined 
until 2010 when it reached 1,432. The following year, Russian-nationals entering Japan on 
entertainer visas slightly increased up to 1,452. Indonesia-nationals entering Japan on entertainer 
visas had peaked in 2005 with 4,086 then drastically decreased in subsequent years. Ukraine-
nationals saw a steady decrease since 2003, where the number peaked at 2,585. South Korean-
nationals experienced a rather similar decrease, though there was much less fluctuation and 
eventually saw an overall increase in 2011. After reaching a decade low in 2009 with just 1,173 
entertainers entering Japan, the numbers increased in 2010 and 2011, where 1,450 and 3,179 
South Korean entertainers entered Japan. United States-nationals entering Japan saw a decade 
long fluctuation, where after peaking in 2003 with 7,066, saw increases and decreases annually, 
where after hitting a decade high in 2009 with 7,288, declined to a decade low with 5,908 in 
2011. United Kingdom-nationals entering Japan on entertainer visas also experienced similar 
fluctuation where after peaking at a decade high in 2010 with 3,009 nationals arriving in Japan 
12 The available statistics only show certain country's nationals entering Japan on entertainer visas for a 
given year. Therefore, there are some gaps and inconsistencies in the presented data. Also due to this 
fact, on the official document, the category of "Other" is also inconsistent and is difficult to assess on a 
yearly basis because Japan inconsistently reports figures from different countries. 
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on entertainer visas, experienced a decade low the next year with 2,474. French nationals 
entering Japan on entertainer visas peaked in 2008 with 1,605 and then steadily decreased in 
subsequent years, reaching 780 in 2011. German nationals entering Japan on entertainer visas 
peaked in 2005 with 2,435 and then experienced slight fluctuation before arriving at 1,358 in 
2011. Romanian nationals entering Japan on entertainer visas peaked in 2003 with 4,871 and 
then decreased in the two following years. 
After the stricter regulations placed on the procurement of entertainer visas in 2005, 
entertainers entering from almost all nations portrayed experienced some kind of decrease in 
succeeding years. However, when examining the data more closely, it becomes evident that 
entertainers from developing and transitioning nations experienced an overall greater decrease 
than entertainers from developed nations. For example, the decrease in the number of 
entertainers entering Japan from China, Philippines, Russia, Ukraine, and Indonesia (and 
possibly Romania) endured a much more significant decrease than entertainers entering from the 
United Stated, United Kingdom, Italy, France, and South Korea. 13 
Considering these factors, this is an indication ofa "developing country" bias in regards 
to the administration of these entertainer visa restrictions. While entertainers entering from 
developed countries only experienced a relatively insignificant decrease over the allotted time 
period, the overall number of entertainers entering from developing or transitioning nations 
experienced a much more profound statistical decrease. As Parrefias has argued, the 
implementation of such legislation has been largely informed by the TIP Report and its 
"findings." Parrefias makes the argument that Japan, through blindly taking the U.S. Department 
13 South Korea actually experienced an overall increase in the number oftrainees entering Japan in the 
corresponding time period. This increase particularly stemmed from the increase that occurred in 2011, 
as demonstrated in the table. 
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of State's advice, has in effect hindered migrant Filipina hostesses who were arriving in Japan on 
such entertainer visas. While not explicitly stated in the TIP Report, developing and 
transitioning countries largely experience a greater degree of human trafficking and migrants 
from these countries are particularly vulnerable to unjust labor practices and human trafficking. 
Considering these notions, it seems that Japan is consciously making a greater effort to withhold 
entertainer visas from third-world nationals compared to individuals from developed countries . 
. IbN' rTable 6 Ch anges m 'New Tramee Arnva s 'y ahona Ity 
Year Total Philippines China Thailand Indonesia Vietnam 
2006 92,864 4,941 61,963 3,776 5,695 
2007 102,018 5,843 68,188 4,022 5,924 6,605 
2008 101,879 5,678 68,860 3,704 6,213 7,124 
2009 80,480 4,726 53,876 2,698 3,980 4,890 
2010 51,725 3,211 28,964 2,386 2,970 3,150 
2011 16,079 775 2,108 1,257 1,186 1,032 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice 2012 
Table 6 shows the number of trainees entering Japan from 2006 - 2011. The number of trainees 
entering Japan peaked in 2007 with 102,018 and has steadily declined since. Nationals from all 
other listed countries peaked in 2007 and 2008. In 2007 nationals from the Philippines peaked at 
5,843, and nationals from Thailand peaked at 4,022. In 2008 nationals from China peaked at 
68,860, nationals from Indonesia peaked at 6,213, and nationals from Vietnam peaked at 7,124. 
All countries experienced decreases in trainees entering Japan in subsequent years. 
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a e . N bT bl 7 Changes In um erofNew ArrivaIs 0 f "Technical Intern Traini ng (1)" by Nationality l4 
2010 2011 
China 20,133 49,311 
Vietnam 2,184 6,632 
Philippines 1,212 3,775 
Indonesia 1,454 3,536 
Thailand 641 1,722 
Cambodia 68 245 
Total 26,022 66,026 
..Source: Japanese MInIstry of JustIce 2012 
The data from Table 7 depicts a steady increase in the two year period since the inception of the 
new Technical Intern Training visa assigned specifically for participation in the Technical 
Internship Program. IS The number of individuals participating in this program from all the listed 
countries showed increases from 2010 to 2011. 
The data in Tables 6 and 7 show the steady decrease in the number of persons entering 
Japan on a trainee visa as well as the shift towards issuing visas specific for participation in the 
Technical Internship Program. Although such trainee visas were indicated to be vectors for 
trafficking persons into Japan and the numbers has been on the decline since the newly 
14 According to the Japanese International Training Organization, the Technical Intern Training Program 
(1) visa indicates that a trainee is entering Japan for his or her first year of training (Japan International 
Training Cooperation Organization 2011) 
15 The trainee visa is a generalized category for any persons undergoing sorts of training in Japan. In 
2010 a new visa category specifically for participants of the Industrial Trainee and Technical Internship 
Program was established and the statistics are ~epicted in Table 7. 
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established visa category for the Technical Internship Program in 2010, this is a relatively 
synonymous visa category through which it has been indicated that exploitation continues to 
occur. While the new visa category can be interpreted as an attempt to prevent human 
trafficking and labor exploitation on the surface, there is little concrete evidence that any such 
attempts to revise these visas have hindered trafficking efforts or made conditions more 
favorable for migrants, nor have there been any indications that these visas are have ceased being 
utilized for facilitation of trafficked or exploited persons. 
In an effort to continue to relate these data to migration and human trafficking, it is 
important to consider that the Technical Internship- Program is largely utilized by migrants from 
developing countries and is not utilized by migrants from developed countries. Since these 
programs often involve efforts to acquire labor skills for use in various low to middle wage 
industries, workers in developed nations need not travel to Japan to find such opportunities. 
Therefore, the "developing world bias" in regards to issuing of trainee visas is not necessarily 
applicable, although it is important to make the indication that migrants from transitioning or 
developing nations are the overwhelming majority of the ones making use ofthese visa 
categories. 
The following table shows the number ofvictims helped at House for Women Saalaa, an 
NOO aimed at helping women who have been victims of human trafficking. While the data is 
somewhat dated, there is an increasing trend corresponding with chronological order. The 
number ofvictims helped has increased as time has progressed. The nations with the most 
recognized trafficking victims were overwhelmingly Thailand and the Philippines. One 
discrepancy is found in the data. 
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T bl e 8 T affiICk' lctlms at H or Women Saalaa a r mg V" ouse fi 
Year Total Thailand Philippines East Asia Other Asian Latin Amer. US/Africa Japan Unknown 
2001 50 10 14 1 2 14 9 
2000 42 6 18 I 2 7 8 
. 1999 52 18 25 5 1 2 I 
1998 21 5 9 1 4 2 
1997 24 6 10 2 5 I 
1996 28 7 12 2 1 6 
1995 32 17 \3 1 1 
1994 67 52 6 7 1 1 
1993 79 72 5 I 1 
1992 42 40 2 
Total 435 233 112 14 9 43 2 21 I 
Source: Saito 20 II 
For the total number of victims identified from Africa and America, the data observed in Saito's 
chapter, "Trafficking ofThai Women," identified that two women were identified as victims 
(one in 1997 and one in 1999), the overall "total" in this category is still recognized as 1 and this 
1 is factored into the overall data of 434, On this chart, these two numbers are identified as two 
and interpreted as a miscalculation, as there is no specific indication anywhere in the work that 
this excess number should not be factored in. 
When analyzing the number ofvictims treated by House for Women Saalasa in relation 
to the official number of trafficking victims as recognized by Japan, some discrepancies arise. 
For the two comparable years of data (2000 and 2001) House for Women Saalaa generally 
treated less victims than were officially recognized by the Japanese government (Chart 8). In 
fact, the only apparent correspondence was that in 2001 House for Women Saalaa helped 12 
Filipino victims, which the Japanese government recognized 14 Filipino victims. Also Japan did 
not recognize any official trafficking victims in 2000 or 2001 who were Japanese nationals, yet 
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House of Women Saalaa has reported that they have helped 8 and 9 trafficking victims is those 
years respectively (Saito 2011). 
I have also tried to contact several NGOs and other organizations that specialize in 
reaching out to human trafficking victims in Japan, including House for Women Saalaa. 
However, I was unable to obtain any data as most did not respond to my inquiries and House for 
Women Saalaa did respond stating that they did not have any relevant data to provide to me. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LEGISLATIVE COMPARISON AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
IN POLICY ADMINISTRATION 
This chapter will examine the situation ofhuman trafficking in Georgia and Japan in the 
years following 2004 when both countries were classified as Tier 2 Watch List on the TIP Report, 
meaning both countries were being censured for their inefficient human trafficking efforts on an 
intemationallevel. The primary purpose will be to examine the differences in the course of 
action between Japan and Georgia and decipher why Georgia was able to elevate itself to from 
this disparaging status to a Tier 1 status on the TIP Report, while Japan has remained immobile 
at Tier 2, in addition to what other variable are at work in the global recognition of Georgia's 
success and Japan's inefficiencies. This chapter will also underscore key differences in the 
current socio-economic situation of these two nations which can be utilized to explain their 
willingness (or lack thereof) to consider and incorporate the recommendations set out by the TIP 
Report. 
Ofthe other nations listed as being a Tier 2 Watch List country on the 2004 TIP Report, 
the only country to have since progressed to a Tier 1 ranking on the latest TIP Report in 2012 is 
Georgia. The nation of Georgia is not a likely candidate to have made such progress due to years 
of political instability, civil strife, and economic hardships, which represents almost a polar 
opposite of Japan's situation. However, the 2005 TIP Report lauded Georgia for making 
improvements and elevated them to the Tier 2 level. Furthermore, the 2007 TIP Report elevated 
Georgia to the status of a Tier 1 country. Despite relatively significant political, economic, and 
social differences, Georgia remains a subject that can be adequately compared to Japan. What 
can be drawn from such analysis is how the actions of Georgia had differed from that of Japan in 
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the years following 2004, so to elevate Georgia to Tier 1, yet leaving Japan stagnant at the Tier 2 
level. In 2003, Georgia was classified as a Tier 3 country, which is the lowest possible 
classification on the TIP Report. The complete reversal in the past decade can provide insights 
into how other countries could address their problems ofhuman trafficking. 
In attempting to draw distinctions between Japan and Georgia this chapter will pay 
particular focus to these countries position within the international community and also further 
consider these positions in relation to the notion of cultural relativism. Where Japan is a notably 
stronger and more established country with more socio-economic prowess, Georgia is still in the 
process oftransitioning into a country with a stable socio-economic situation. This chapter will 
show how the different socio-economic position of these nations provides both different motives 
for each country to address and react to international criticism on trafficking protocol, and how 
accordingly, Japan is able to retain and enact more culturally relative approaches to society 
within their policy formation. Georgia - on the contrary has greater consequences to face in the 
international community in they chose to reject these international pressures, therefore must be 
more sensitive in their policy formation and practice less cultural relativism because of this. 
4.1. Background ofHuman Trafficking in Georgia 
While Japan has been designated a destination country for human trafficking, Georgia 
has been identified as a source, transit, and to a smaller extent a destination country for 
trafficking victims (Democracy and Freedom Watch 2012; Shahinian 2008; u.S. Department of 
State 2012). Georgia is the source country, particularly for women and girls trafficked for sexual 
exploitation. The major receiving countries of Georgian girls and women who have been victims 
of sex trafficking are Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, though to a lesser extent Spain, 
Greece, and Israel have also been destination countries for trafficked women and girls (U.S. 
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Department of State 2012). Women from Central Asia have also been observed working as 
prostitutes in Georgian cities (Bigg and Imedaishvili 2012; Shahinian 2008). Links have been 
drawn that demonstrate that these prostitutes are victims ofhuman trafficking orchestrated by 
organize crime or are susceptible to exploitative labor practices. 
Aside from sexual exploitation, there have also been cases of human trafficking and labor 
exploitation that occur outside of the sex sector. Men, women, and children are vulnerable to 
labor exploitation both domestically and internationally. Georgian males have had a long history 
of migration to Russia and territories in the former Soviet Union (Shelley 2010). After the 
disbanding of the Soviet state, the state run agencies that had once engaged in active roles 
facilitating migration broke up and were replaced by more independent individuals and 
enterprises which were operating in neo-liberal markets with contemporary capital flows. These 
individualized operators in the new global market often looked towards these potential migrants 
as "free labor" and numerous cases of males from former Soviet states were observed in 
instances of exploitative labor throughout the former Soviet Union (Shahinian 2008). In Georgia, 
there have also been cases where migrant workers, particularly from China, have been confined 
to work and live in crammed spaces unable to leave such conditions (Democracy and Freedom 
Watch 2012). Reports of these conditions led to subsequent investigations of these conditions 
which resulted in procurement of those involved in the trafficking process. Louise Shelley has 
made note of several cases ofhuman trafficking and potentially dangerous circumstances 
existing in Georgia. Shelley notes the case of a high ranking border official witnessing a group 
of Indian males exiting a plane from Moscow and completely bypassing passport check points 
(2010: 104). Shelley states that such actions "reveal the lineages of criminals, the careful 
preparation of human smugglers, and the complicity of officials that facilitate this movement." 
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(ibid.) Such actions depict the complex and severe nature of the existing human trafficking 
industry that persists in the nation of Georgia. 
The TIP Report provides some statistics annually which are summarized below. 
!~ble 8 Inve,~J~ti~!l~_~d Convicti~I!~~~I;:£uted bY.Q~~~g~'E!_~~!hc:?!!!i~~,___ ,___ __________ 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
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Source: U.S. Department of State (2004 - 2012) 
Table 8 shows the numbers of investigations and convictions of trafficking offenders in 

the years following the Tier 2 Watch List classification. The Table shows fluctuation in both 

categories over the corresponding time period. In 2004, the Georgian government convicted 3 

persons for trafficking related offenses; the number of investigations was not specified. In 2005 

there were 9 convictions of trafficking offenders and 27 investigations. In 2006 there were 19 

convictions and 28 investigations. In 2007 there were 10 convictions and 34 investigations. In 

2008 there were 10 convictions and 14 investigations. In 2009 there were 37 convictions and 12 

investigations. In 2010 there were 4 convictions and 11 investigations. The data shows that in 
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the years following their Tier 2 Watch List classification, Georgia produced more investigations 
and convictions. Peaking in investigations in 2007 and investigations in 2009, in the following 
years the Georgian government experienced lows in both convictions and investigations. 
This data shows Georgia's commitment to human trafficking after the 2004 classification 
as a Tier 2 Watch List country. The data shows that in 2005 - 2007 Georgia saw a comparably 
greater number of investigations and convictions of trafficking offenders, as did 2009 (2008 
seemed was inconsistent). In 2010 and 2011 these numbers decreased by almost half. Why this 
happens remains uncertain, though it could signify two possible sequences: that Georgia feels 
comfortable with their Tier 1 classification or that Georgia has actually made significant strides 
to reducing human trafficking in their nation. However, the latter must be cautiously considered, 
as the full dynamics ofhuman trafficking in Georgia are not well-established and although the 
government has made considerable efforts to address trafficking, the available sources exist in a 
very limited scope and thorough ethnographic and empirical studies must further be carried out 
at a scholarly and governmental level to draw definite conclusions. 
One distinction with Japan that can be also be drawn is that the TIP Report demonstrates 
significantly harsher penalties administered on those convicted in Georgia for trafficking related 
offenses in comparison with those convicted in Japan. For example, in Georgia for 2011, out of 
the 5 convicted, all received sentences ranging from 6 - 15 years. Whereas on the contrary in 
Japan, in 2011, 20 persons for trafficking related offenses, 18 ofwhich were convicted and 
sentences which ranged a year and a half to four years imprisonment (U.S. Department of State 
2012). This represents a strong distinction between penalties imposed by Japan and Georgia in 
the sentencing of individuals for trafficking related individuals. Evidently, Georgian policies are 
significantly harsher on the persecutors compared to Japan. 
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Victims 
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Source: U.S. Department of State (2004 - 2012) 
The above Table demonstrates the overall number ofhuman trafficking victims identified by 
Georgia from 2004 - 2012. In 2004 there were 15 recognized victims. In 2005 there were 18 
recognized victims. In 2006 there were 29 recognized victims. In 2007 there were 48 
recognized victims. In 2008 there were 21 recognized victims. In 2009 there were 48 
recognized victims. In 2010 there were 19 recognized victims. In 2011 there were 18 officially 
recognized victims. In February of2012, there were two identified victims, both of whom were 
Uzbek prostitutes recognized to be victims of sex trafficking. 16 
The years following 2004, similar to the number of investigations and convictions of 
trafficking offenders, saw a greater number of official victims recognized. Similarly also, is that 
in 2008 recognized victims also experienced a decrease, and 2010 and beyond Georgia appears 
16 Because of the timing ofthe release ofthe 2012 TIP Report, these were the only numbers recorded for 
the reported time period. At the time the data can be considered incomplete and a more thorough 
statistical representation can be expected in the 20 l3 TIP Report which is expected to be released in June 
2013. 
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to have dedicated less attention to identifying trafficking victims. Accordingly, whether this is a 
result ofGeorgia's more carefree approach to traffickihg efforts because their co'hcerns within 
the international community have been pacified or because their efforts have been greatly 
successful has yet to be determined. 
In comparison to Japan, the number of officially recognized trafficking victims in 
Georgia remained somewhat low. Japan officially recognized a more significant number of 
overall human trafficking victims over the corresponding time period (2003 2011). However, 
it is important to acknowledge that the dynamics of the human trafficking situation in Japan are 
drastically different to that ofGeorgia. What further is discerning is Georgia's decreasing trends 
in both victims acknowledged and persons convicted and prosecuted. It will be interesting to 
observe whether Georgia's efforts will continue at such a level and if so, how will they classify 
in subsequent TIP Reports. 
4.2. Actions Taken by Georgia 
In 2004 Georgia was placed on Tier 2 Watch List because of "its failure to provide 
evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons compared to the 
previous year, and its commitment to take future steps over the next year." The report clarifies 
that although Georgia's efforts were recognized in 2003 but in the past year a new Georgian 
government came into power (U.S. Department of State 2004). The U.S. Department of State 
expected the new government to "respond more effectively to institutional weakness and 
corruption which hindered the previous government's anti-trafficking efforts" (ibid.). The report 
further concludes that it is necessary for the new Georgian government to take continued 
preventative actions fighting human trafficking in order to continue and improve their efforts to 
combat trafficking in persons. 
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In 2004 (after its Tier 3 classification in 2003), the Anti-Trafficking Department was 
, disbanded in Jul, and was renewed in Nov~mber with an entirely ne~ office and soon after the' 
"Main Directorate for combating the illegal circulation ofnarcotics, trafficking and illegal 
migration" was established (ibid.). This included a newly "established and adequately funded" 
innovative anti-trafficking unit which was adequately staffed. This initiative investigated 
trafficking cases and broke up trafficking operations in Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan; the 
traffickers were subsequently prosecuted and convicted to lengthy terms (U.S. Department of 
State 2005). 
In 2005 the TIP Report noted recognized that although Georgia still did not comply with 
the minimum standards to eliminate trafficking although they are still making significant efforts 
to do so. The primary explanation was that the newly established government appeared less 
interested in human trafficking concerns than the previous regime (ibid.). The report notes 
multiple improved steps that the Georgian government has enacted which they identified as an 
improvement from the past year, however, the report notes that "some important pledges remain 
unfulfilled" (ibid). These revisions include establishing a new anti- trafficking police unit which 
replaced the previous government's inefficient anti-trafficking force, revising and endorsing a 
"comprehensive National Action Plan," appointed a "primary point of contact for trafficking," 
and established interagency collaboration committee" (ENAP ATES 2008). Although the 
government of Georgia has made strides to address trafficking from the previous year, still 
relatively few trafficking victims were identified to receive protection and assistance for their 
hardships. 
The cause for the lower classification stems from the fact that in 2004, Georgia made no 
improvements from the past year to enhance their efforts to prevent trafficking in persons, which 
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the TIP Report identifies as a reaction of a shift in political regime. The lack of governmental 
attention !$ven to human trafficking Was ultimately responsibletfor the Tier 2 Watch List tating. 
In 2005, the Georgian government, though still being identified as "not fully [complying] with 
the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking", the nation still achieved a better 
classification because of enhanced governmental enforcement and overall governmental efforts 
to address trafficking in persons. 
In 2007, the TIP Report declared that: 
Over the past year, the government made considerable progress in the prosecution and 
punishment of traffickers, prosecution and punishment of traffickers, protection and 
assistance for victims, and prevention of trafficking. Georgia developed and 
implemented a victim-centered national referral mechanism, provided a building for the 
country's first trafficking victims' shelter, dedicated on-going funding for victim 
assistance, passed comprehensive trafficking legislation, aggressively prosecuted and 
toughened penalties for traffickers, and initiated multiple proactive prevention programs 
(U.S. Department of State 2007). 
The praise asserted to Georgia's efforts explains how and why Georgia increased from a Tier 2 
country to a Tier 1 country. This is certainly a result of Georgia enactipg the "Law of Georgia 
on Combating Human Trafficking" which was adopted April 28, 2006 and was enacted on June 
16, 2006. This legislation had four main purposes, which were: 
a) To ensure facilitation to prevention and combating trafficking by means of protection 
ofthe rights of victims of trafficking; b) To ensure protection, assistance and 
. rehabilitation of victims of human trafficking; c) To determine specificities of 
prosecuting the crime ofhuman trafficking; d) To set the principles ofco-operation 
among state agencies, international organizations and legal entities in preventing and 
combating trafficking as well as in the protection, assistance and rehabilitation ofvictims 
of trafficking 
This thirteen page document includes twenty-five articles whose objectives can be roughly 
summarized: 1) creating explicit and definable definitions for matters related to human 
trafficking; 2) clearly defining state policy in combating human trafficking and identifying 
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mechanisms to enact in order to further prevent trafficking in persons; 3) evaluate the ability of 
state agencies to fight human trafficking and aiding victims, in addition to establish(ng criteria 
for their administration ofanti-trafficking legislation; 4) establish clear cut definitions for how 
the Georgian government will provide funding for human trafficking victims (an act that has 
been particularly lauded by the U.S. Department of State in the TIP Report in subsequent years); 
5) ensure proper legal and medical benefits of trafficked victims, which include legal protection 
and financial reimbursement; 6) outline criminal proceedings of how human trafficking cases are 
to be administered. The actual document is very extensive in its detail of how Georgia should 
address and negotiate matters ofhuman trafficking and the law provides very thorough 
explanations ofsuch procedures. 
Georgia had succeeded in enhancing their rating on the TIP Report because they had 
shown enhanced dedication in addressing trafficking after receiving critical feedback from. The 
efforts of Georgia in 2005 were a direct result of their TIP Report categorization, although their 
later efforts appear to be less driven by external pressures and more so by their own agenda to 
combat trafficking, which has led to the TIP Report acknowledging their efforts. 
4.3. Comparison with Japan and Cultural Relativism 
Over the allotted time since their classification as Tier 2 Watch List countries on the 2004 
TIP Report, Japan and Georgia have taken different initiatives to address human trafficking with 
their borders. Both countries have adapted their laws and made their policies against human 
trafficking more stringent in a course of action advised by outside forces Georgia significantly 
more than Japan. However, what is to account for this difference in action? Why has Georgia 
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been engagingly proactive in fighting trafficking, whereas Japan as remained passively 
I disengaged in adopting 8:nd implementing impactfttl trafficking legislation? I I 
To explain the differences in courses of action and attitudes towards human trafficking 
protocol in these two nations, there are multiple factors at work that allow Japan to take such an 
approach, and to a certain extent demand Georgia adopt such an approach. The socio-economic 
conditions in each country vary greatly, and the roles ofthese respective economies in the global 
market and international community are drastically disparate. As a result of Japan's relatively 
self-sufficiency and economic capabilities, Japan has been able to adopt such a cultural relativist 
approach to these outside forces which have applied pressure on Japan for their inept policies. If 
Japan is chastised by the international community for their anti-trafficking policies, they need not 
be as concerned as a developing or transitioning nation who relies heavily on support from the 
international community. The dynamics of Japanese society permits Japan to take a laissez-faire 
approach towards trafficking legislation and cu'Itural relativism can be appropriated as a pretext 
for such actions. The Japanese governments' concerns and the issues within Japanese society 
establish this cultural relativist approach, particularly in the eve of the catastrophic earthquake 
and tsunami which inflicted massive damage on northern Japan in 2011. 
Japan has established a permanent face in the international community and has made 
itself a global force in the global economy. Many countries remain reliant on Japan for various 
exports and as a highly developed nation does not need to concern itself significantly without 
outside criticism. Georgia, however, is still a transitioning nation which does not have such a 
stable footing in the international community. Therefore, Georgia has much to lose if it becomes 
known as a country associated with a concerning level ofhuman trafficking that does not take 
proper actions. Georgia has much more to lose from negative responses from the TIP Report 
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than Japan does. Mahdavi has pointed out that the degree to which countries comply with the 
recommendations/of the TIP Report reflects -both their Tier categorizatIon and their impression irl 
the international community (Madhavi 2011). Countries that have strong standing relationships 
with the U.S. - Madhavi uses France as a particular example - have received generally positive 
classification by the TIP Report although they may be experiencing less than assertive human 
trafficking situations. On the contrary, a country like Iran - who although experiences human 
trafficking has generally lower levels of trafficking than France and also better policies of 
national security - is typically placed on a lower Tier as a result of their relationship with the U.S. 
(Mahdavi 2011: 21). Mahdavi has made note of significant efforts by Iran to set up shelters and 
NGOs who address the needs ofmigrant populations and how a member of the TIP office "noted 
in conversation her bewilderment regarding Iran's Tier 3 designation and acknowledged that her 
office did not have sufficiently strong sources inside Iran to provide reliable information about 
the 'trafficking situation'" (ibid.). 
4.3.a. Economic Comparison 
There are several key differences between George and Japan that can be underscored, 
however, the socio-economic development and the levels of internal civil strife are a significant 
indicator of these factors. According to World Bank, Georgia is described as a "Lower Middle 
Income" nation, where as Japan is defined as a "High Income" nation. 17 According to the IMF, 
17 Data available here: http://data.worldbank.orglcountry/georgia#cp_wdiR_and here: 
http://data.worldbank.org!country/japan#cp_wdi. 
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Japan's unemployed population accounts for 4.520% of the nation's total labor force, while 
Georgia's uhemployed population made up 13.824% of the total'labor force (for 2013).18 5ross 
Domestic Production (GDP) is also another factor for assessing a nation's economic wealth and 
success. According to World Bank, in 2011 Japan's GDP totaled $5,867,154,491,918 USD, 
while George's totaled $14,366,527,680 USD,19 In an international perspective, this puts 
Japan's GDP at third in the world, while Georgia ranks at 113th• This significant difference in 
GDP draws attention to the drastically different capabilities of each economy and reflects the 
economic conditions of each society. 
Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is another such indicator of a nation's economic 
well-being. FDI is defined by the World Bank as "the net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent or more ofvoting stock) in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor". The more a country can invest in the other nations is a 
similarly relevant signifier of a nation's economic well-being. 
Table 10 shows how Japan has been significantly more active in their FDI from 2003 ­
2011. With a few exceptions (2006 and 2011) Japan has consistently produced more FDI than 
Georgia has by several times values. This notion is a direct testament to Japan's more advanced 
economic stability in the global community. This factor, in concurrence with Japan's markedly 
higher GDP works to demonstrate Japan's more advanced economic position and more, 
significant market stability vis-a.-vis Georgia's economy 
18 Data available here: 

http://www.imf.org/extemaVpubs/ft/weoI20 12l02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=48&pr.y=7 &sy=20 IO&ey 

=2017&scsm=l&ssd=l&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=915%2C158&s=LUR%2CLE%2CLP&grp=O&a= 

19 Data available here: 

http://data.worldbank.org/indicatorlNY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2011+wbapi_data_val 

ue+wbapi_ data _ value-Iast&sort=desc 
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4.3.h. Socio-Cultural Factors and Cultural Relativism 
The advanced socio-economic status of Japan allows greater flexibility and practice of 
cultural relativism in its policy administration. While not traditionally used to describe the 
actions of a government entity, in this instance, concepts of cultural relativism are applicable to 
the discussion of how policy adoption is being informed and how socio-economic achievement 
allows for a culture to protect what values it asserts as important. This section will explain how 
Japan's cultural relativism has been appropriated by government policies to reinforce ideas of 
modem society and to reject external pressures to conform to international normative standards. 
In the context of this paper, cultural relativism will be discussed as a means to expound 
on how human trafficking policy agendas can be affected by other variables (in this case, socio­
economic well-being). With regards to human trafficking and the extern pressures administered 
by the TIP Report and other sources, a nation like Japan is able to appropriate notions of cultural 
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relativism in their implementation of trafficking policies and remain relatively undaunted 
I towards external deinands because of their gldbal positioning. I I 
As Mahdavi has asserted, a nation's classification by the TIP Report can influence its 
position and perception within the global community. However, developed nations like Japan ­
who need not rely on significant external assistance for national operation - are less likely to feel 
the negative ramifications of these classifications and are thus less inclined to receive these 
external criticisms earnestly. One's pace of economic stability and general development will 
receive, interpret, and act upon these classifications differently. 
How does cultural relativism relate to human trafficking policy? It must first be 
considered, drawing upon the analysis ofKevin Yamaga-Karns (1995), how Japanese officials 
stressed Japan's homogeneity and collective groupist identity which has been appropriated as a 
means of promoting its successful postwar recovery and national economic progression. This 
group-centered association has been delivered by government authorities throughout history and 
has been utilized to reinforce the urgency of a collective society that works harmoniously 
(Marfording 1997). The imminent threat that a massive influx of foreigners would impose on 
these hegemonic ideologies is profound enough for the Japanese to remain skeptical towards 
universally adopting the liberal-focused policies towards internal human rights despite their 
commitments to do so (ibid.). 
Equally important to these discussions of Japanese cultural relativism is how Japan 
contextualizes and defines itself in relation to foreigners and outside entities. In this sense, the 
notions of uchi and sofo are best utilized to explain such distinction. These terms, uchi to 
identify inclusiveness and sofo to identify otherness, have become a focal point of debate around 
Japanese identity politics. This uchi, which embodies the essence of Japanese self, exists 
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opposite ofsofo, which signifies the outer exclusion of Japanese society (Creighton 1997). 
Foreigners~ both visible (legal migraits) and invisible (undoc~ent migrants), comprise ttfe bulk 
ofthe sofo category, which also include Japan's indigenous minorities and outcasts (such as the 
Ainu, burakumin, and the Okinawans). Leslie Writes explains the uchi-sofo relationship as: 
Although interacting networks of relationships in Japan are also conceptualized in 
uchilsofo terms, such that the indexical framework of uchi and sofo is situational and 
shifting, there is a general sense that all of Japan creates an uchi, a national inside 
boundary ofaffiliation, in contrast to everything that is sofo or outside of Japan (Writes 
2011) 
Japan uses these terms to define itself and establish that the criteria to being included in the uchi 
are blood or complete naturalization; anything short of these two criteria will be designated to . 
sofo. This provides a complex and ambiguous situation for those marginal Others who exist in 
between Japan's uchi and sofo. For example, ethnic Koreans or Chinese in Japan, who are 
culturally Japanese in all respects, are often marginalized into the sofo unless they adopt full-
scale assimilation to Japanese society, which would entail relinquishing any form of ethnic 
identity and thus moving from the margins into the uchi. Phenotypically different foreigners 
existing in the sofo present another example, as even though they can renounce their citizenship 
and naturalize to obtain Japanese nationality, they are still situation in Japan's sofo because they 
are not Japanese by blood. 
How cultural relativism and concepts ofuchi and sofo reflect concerns ofhuman 
. trafficking and informing human trafficking policy are important in two specific ways. Firstly, 
although recognized as an important issue by authorities, human trafficking - due to its 
clandestine characteristics, occurrence outside the public view, and greater macro-level societal 
concerns confronting Japan - is often relegated to a less significant role and attention often is not 
brought into the discourse ofthe general public. The fact that human trafficking occurs so far 
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out ofpublic sight and the fact that commercial sex is largely accepted in mainstream Japanese 
society, the idea that sexual e~ploitation persists in Japat often escapes the minds ~f ordinary 
Japanese. Moreover, Japan is currently engaged in a number of domestic concerns after the 2011 
earthquake that devastated northeastern Japan. Issues ofhow funds for reconstruction are to be 
allocated and debates around the continued use ofnuclear energy and other matters of energy 
production have permeated throughout Japanese society and pose some of the most pressing 
concerns of Japan today. Human trafficking discourse has been placed in the peripheral to these 
more immediate concerns. 
Secondly, human trafficking involves areas that can potential threaten the established 
ideologies of homogeneity and collective groupism still evident in Japanese society. Acting on 
these recommendations to improve their trafficking legislation would be acknowledging Japan's 
inefficiencies of the current polices they have in place. Given Japan's traditional values on self-
respect and pride historically, acknowledging the reproach and vituperation of outside sources 
would place Japan in an inferior position and bring about shame and humility to the nation as a 
whole(Shibuichi 2005). 20 Furthermore, human trafficking is closely tied to issues ofmigration. 
Recognizing human trafficking would require Japan to take a more steadfast approach to issues 
ofmigration and act upon these outside criticisms. This relates back to Japan's cultural relativist 
stance towards migration issues fifteen years ago. Strong trafficking protocol would likely 
require Japan to rework immigration policies to make greater efforts to concern themselves with 
the well-being of immigrants which would remain a threat to Japanese relativist ideas of 
20 Other Japanese traditional values based in traditional belief systems and morals such as Shintoism, 
Confucianism, and Buddhism, may be at root for explaining Japan's detachment from concern for issues 
pertaining to sexual issues, as historically these had not garnered significant attention, and such attitudes 
can remain embedded in Japanese ideology (Leupp 2003; Wieringa 2009). 
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homogeneity and collective groupism. 
I IWhile collectivt groupist identity is definitely still highly regarded iJ Japan, traditional 
ideologies have seen more resistance recently and Japanese youth and underrepresented groups 
have sought ways to express and promote their attempts at resistance (Cornyetz 1994; 
Marfording 1997; Sterling 20lO)?! As traditionalism would place concerns such as international 
rights ofmigrants or increased rights and reception of foreign workers in the margins of Japanese 
society, increased awareness and emergence ofNGOs and activist groups are gradually bringing 
these issues closer to the mainstream issues that receive copious attention. It is such forms and 
movements of organized resistance that can potentially lead to changes in cultural relativist 
attitudes ofJapan and encourage Japan to take a stricter anti-human trafficking stance and more 
pro-migration stance towards foreigners. 
How do Japanese definition of self and cultural relativism relate to Georgia'S approach to 
human trafficking policy? Japan, as a country with greater established socio-economic prowess, 
can remain more exclusive and enact these relativist inclusive paradigms when resisting external 
pressures - both publically and discreetly to inform how receptive they are to policy adoption. 
Japan is able to continue to emphasize its domestic concepts of uchi-soto adoption because it 
does not face international ramifications that would worsen Japanese societal issues. Therefore, 
Japan is able to confidently appropriate their constructed ideas of self in their political ideology. 
Georgia has been much more proactive in addressing issues ofhuman trafficking which have 
arose and has also been much more receptive and considering towards outside criticism. 
21 Marfording mentions how Japanese youth are becoming more democratic and willing to engage in 

more politically challenging activism than they have been historically. Sterling draws attention to 

Japanese appropriations of reggae movements as resistance to traditional Japanese societal norms. 

Cornyetz indicates how Japanese youth have appropriated hip-hop movements and consumption of 

African-American culture to resist Japanese societal norms. 
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Georgia's preemptive agenda has allowed them to elevate from the Tier 2 Watch List 
I 
'fi' L I' f fi I .. l IcIaSSl lcatlOn toller In a span 0 Ive years. The soclo-economic differences and differences 
in their global position allow Japan to act more independent and selective in regards to how they 
consider outside criticism; for Georgia to take such an approach would significantly jeopardize 
their national position as Georgia remains reliant on external assistance for the functionality of 
their nation. Georgia cannot afford to take the laissez-faire attitude Japan has adopted because 
the ramifications would be significantly greater. 
In essence, the Japanese self-definition of their own culture, especially the concept of 
uchi-soto, reflects a certain degree ofethnocentrism. This in turn impacts Japan's reaction to 
external pressures. In the case of anti-trafficking measures this research indicates that Japanese 
national self-esteem mitigates the effects ofinternational pressure. When one compares Japan's 
actions with the situation of Georgia, it demonstrates how socio-economic standing can influence 
a nation's policy-making reaction to external pressures. Japan's steadfast attitude based on 
commonly held perceptions ofhomogeneity and discursive, self-inclusive identity represent 
Japan's traditional philosophy as well as a basis for its reaction to the international community. 
Japan can afford to dismiss or downplay aspects of international pressure because of its advanced 
socio-economic status. On the contrary, a nation like Georgia, which is still establishing its 
position in the global community, is much more conscious and concerned with the opinion of the 
international community. For Georgia, the implications for remaining disconnected from such 
criticism can potentially lead to worldly exclusion and reproach, not dissimilar to that ofNorth 
Korea or Iran. External forces in more influential positions of power can pressure (to some 
extent - intimidate) countries in less influential positions because the ramifications of 
disregarding these more influential external forces can be critical to a country's future attainment. 
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Cultural relativism involved visualizing the actions and norms of a culture in the context 
of that (ulture specifically. Doing'so, one hopes to avoid bia~es or misclassifications b~sed on 
moral judgments or culturally hegemonic interpretations of outside cultures. In the milieu of this 
discussion, a nation's ability to emphasize and enact cultural relativist ideologies is to some 
extent dependent on their socio-economic standing and what they can or cannot afford to lose in 
the global community. Although met with cries for concern by international bodies, Japan's 
reluctant attitudes towards their trafficking protocol are an example of how a country with the 
socio-economic stability of Japan is able to utilize cultural relativist thresholds within its society. 
However, Georgia needs to be more sensitive to these external criticisms and demands from 
outside bodies because Georgia, as a transitioning state, has much more at stake in the 
international community. Therefore, one's ability to enact such cultural relativist approaches (in 
this specific case - to human trafficking agenda) can be contingent on one's socio-economic 
positioning in the global community, as well as one's desire to protect their image in the global 
. 22
communIty. 
22 Although it is entirely outside the scope of this discussion on cultural relativism, it must also be 
considered how willing nations may be to act upon such criticism and how concerned they are with their 
perception amongst the global community. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSI0.,NI I I 
Japan's human trafficking agenda can be addressed in the context of both a concrete and 
abstract essence. In concrete terms, this thesis has highlighted the many realities and perceptions 
of human trafficking in Japan, in addition to ongoing debates about the severity of the situation 
which has led to misconceptions and further complexities facing activists and authorities. At the 
same time, on an abstract level, it has addressed cultural relativism and how the Japanese define 
themselves in a global context factors in to their administration ofhuman trafficking policy and 
how the authorities react to concerns over human trafficking. 
Two important conclusions regarding human trafficking in Japan can be adequately 
deduced. First, the human trafficking legislation imposed in 2004 has impacted migration trends 
in several ways. It has most notably impacted the number of entertainers migrating from 
developing and transitioning nations seeking to enter Japan under legal premises. The overall 
number of entertainers entering Japan experienced a decreased from 134,879 in 2004 to 26,112 
in 2011. The populations most heavily impacted by these changes have disproportionately been 
migrants from developing and transitioning countries. Generally speaking, entertainers from 
developed nations saw a relatively consistent trend of stability or a slight decrease whereas 
migrant entertainers from developing or transitioning nations experienced a notably significant 
decrease. This demonstrates a "third world bias" in Japan's administration of its human 
trafficking policy as migrants from developing and transitioning nations have been 
disproportionality impacted by these regulations. 
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Secondly, Japan has been able to appropriate culturally relative ideologies in their policy 
I ! I I I 
formation because oftheir more advanced position in the global community. As a country with a 
strongly establish economy, relatively stable economy, and situated in the global north, Japan has 
been able to continue focusing on culturally relative issues within the context oftheir own 
society. Although this is not to say that Japan does not consider human trafficking a concern in 
any sense, Japan is able to prioritize their agenda and react relatively autonomously, and how 
they deem appropriate, with regards to external pressures and criticisms (as has been the case to 
their reactions to the TIP Report). Japan's willingness to cooperate and seriously consider these 
criticisms is limited to how importantly Japan sees these issues relative to their society, and 
Japan is able to do so because they are an economic power with a stable society and relied upon 
by other nations for continued economic investments and assistance. Georgia, on the contrary, 
as a country situated in the global south, which has experienced internal civil strife and 
developmental issues, remains reliant on other nations for support. As a result, Georgia is unable 
to remain as autonomous or culturally relative in their policy agenda, because doing so would 
cause them to lose face in the global community and could have detrimental results for their 
nation. 
When comparing the two nations these matters elucidate. In response to the TIP Report's 
Tier 2 Watch List classification of both countries in 2004, both nations readily replied with some 
degree of response aimed at addressing these issues, which ultimately resulted in both nations 
elevating to Tier 2 the subsequent year. However, since this initial response the report has 
consistently lauded Georgia for their efforts and even elevated their status since to Tier 1. In the 
period from 2005 - 2012, the report has remained critical of Japan and their dedication to truly 
addressing human trafficking issues. 
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As Mahdavi has noted, while the TIP Report is by no means an infallible gauge of 
I I I I 
assessment, the repercussions a nation could face from their classification by the TIP Report can 
be significant and impact the nation's international perception and relations within the global 
community. This is where Japan's stronger and more stable socio-economic prowess is able to 
be utilized to maintain a cultural relativist standpoint vis-a.-vis pressures external. Japan is an 
already established global power and needs not to be influenced by a tool such as the TIP Report. 
Georgia is more susceptible to the repercussions that could potentially unfold if they are further 
ostracized as a country that makes inconsequential efforts to combat human trafficking; the TIP 
Report could paint a more damaging depiction of Georgia and could potentially result in other 
nations becoming unwilling to engage with Georgia or to administer more demanding pressure to 
address human trafficking. 
To ascertain that Georgia takes a more progressive approach to human trafficking policy 
than Japan does, fails to grasp the true complexity of the dynamics at work that result in these 
policy approaches. While this may evidently be true, it is crucial to understand what variables 
elicit these responses from Georgia and Japan and why these nations engage these criticisms in 
such their respective ways. The short answer is that Japan is less vulnerable to the ramifications 
ofthe responses than Georgia is and can thus respond in such a manner. As a result of such 
vulnerability, Georgia is forced to respond to critiques of the global community in a more 
efficient manner than Japan. 
The future has yet to be predicted for Japan's position in the global community with 
regards to their human trafficking policy. The international community has consistently shown 
concerns about human trafficking in Japan though in recent years have refrained from aggressive 
criticism and demands. Japan has shown greater concern with more culturally relative and more 
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immediately pressing issues which are confronting Japanese (Le. the earthquake and tsunami 
I I I I 
recovery, the nuclear power debate). It is particularly interesting to see whether or not the future 
TIP Reports and other global analyses will acknowledge Japan's domestic issues and consider 
them in their analysis of human trafficking in Japan or if they will come down harder on Japan 
for their lack of effective protocol. 
Japanese policy makers face a challenge in that if they do not eventually seriously 
address human trafficking, the censure from the international community will grow stronger; 
thus forcing them to address the problem as they did in 2004. If Japan is going to make a notable 
impact on human trafficking, they will need to do more than just pass superficial legislation with 
the earnest intention of doing more than solely appeasing the external forces that are pressuring 
them. This requires Japan to identify that they are experiencing a serious case ofhuman 
trafficking; an act which the government has repeatedly neglected to do. As to whether or not 
Japan will fruitfully do so, remains unclear at this moment specifically because of the more 
public issues pressing Japanese society today. 
John Lie has noted how the "invisibility" of foreigners in Japan has led to their issues 
becoming relegated to the peripheries of Japanese society despite their domestic-driven activism 
(Lie 2009). Human trafficking similarly is at risk of falling into a state of "invisibility" in Japan 
as both international and domestic pressures to address these matters are often subsumed by 
larger and more socio-politically driven issues. It is essential that Japan not let human trafficking 
concerns vanish completely, as doing so would likely lead to an increase in human trafficking, as 
opportunistic traffickers will recognize the lack of authoritative attention and seek to mobilize 
new victims into Japan. 
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It is difficult to say what kind of approach towards human trafficking policy Japan will 
I , I I I 
take in the coming decade and how external pressures will continue to influence their policy 
development. The 2013 TIP Report (forthcoming) will be a strong indicator ofhow Japan will 
approach human trafficking in the near future, as a worse ranking in 2013 or future years would 
likely entice Japan to only enact more superficial protocol. If Japan remains at a Tier 2 
classification, the likelihood of any new actions being implemented remains unlikely. It is 
highly unlikely that Japan will actively propose any novel legislation without external pressure. 
This creates a delicate and complex situation regarding how Japan could and should handle 
issues ofhuman trafficking. While human trafficking may not be deemed the most relative issue 
confronting Japanese society today, it still amounts to serious human rights violations of its 
victims and needs to seriously be addressed. Since Japan has not yet shown their commitment to 
addressing these issues, the future remains very unclear. 
It is unlikely that the polemical objectives and priorities of the international community 
and Japan will converge into a mutual understanding resulting in progressive protocol which 
both parties are content with. However, if the international community is able to recognize and 
respect Japan's stance to remain culturally relative to their society and understand Japan's 
feeling to immediately address these issues, while Japan equally acknowledges the international 
community's goal of addressing human trafficking universally and fighting for the protection of 
human rights, then perhaps a mutual recognition in which both parties are content can be reached 
in some way. This would require Japan to acknowledge that they need to take a proactive stance 
and not just pass shallow legislation meant only to appease critical commentators. Until this type 
ofunderstanding can be reached, it is likely that the international community will remain critical 
of Japan and that the human trafficking situation in Japan will remain as it stands. 
71 
APPENDIX 

" 
I I 
List of Japanese Terms 
Burakumin ($~~) - term used to refer to a Japanese social class who has historically been 
classified at the lowest ranks of Japanese society 
Dekasegi (ili~ ~') - term used to describe migrant workers in Japan, but primarily applied to 
Nikkeijin migrants 
Japayukisan (~-y /~ ~ ~ ~ Iv) - term used to describe non-Japanese prostitutes who 
mobilized to Japan for sex work 
Karayukisan (J~1T ~ ~ Iv) - term used to describe Japanese prostitutes who mobilized to other 
destinations in Asia for sex work 
Kiken (fIt~~) - dangerous 
Kitanai (151.- ') - dirty 
Kitsui ( t5 "J ~ ~ ) - intense, hard, severe 
Jinshinbaibai (A~n-'i) - term used to denote the sale in humans, commonly used to refer to 
human trafficking 
Jinshintorihiki (A~ It\[ 51) - term used to denote the exchange in humans, commonly used to 
refer to human trafficking 
Nihonjinron (EI *A~) - term used to describe the theoretical arguments projected to explain 
the cultural uniqueness of the Japanese people 
Nikkeijin (EI ~A) - term used to describe people of ethnically Japanese descent who are born 
outside of Japan 
Nopankisa (J ~/~/~~) - an establishment where clientele are served by waitresses in short 
skirts wearing no underwear, often on a mirrored floor 
Soto(7}-) - term used to denote outside 
Uchi (r7'J) - term used to denote inside 
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List of Abbreviations 
, I I I 
ECPAT International- End Child Prostitution and Trafficking International 
GNP - Gross National Product 
ILO - International Labor Organization 
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization 
TIP Report - Trafficking in Persons Report 
TVPA Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
UNDOC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
73 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

I I I I 
Anderson, Bridget and Rutvica Andrijasevic. "Sex, Slaves and Citizens: The Politics ofAnti­
Trafficking." Soundings 40 (2008): 135-145. 
Andrijasevic, Rutvica. Migration, Agency and Citizenship in Sex Trafficking. New York: 
Pal grave Macmillan, 2008. 
Bales, Kevin. Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy. 2nd ed. Berkeley: 
University ofCalifornia Press, 2004. 
Bales, Kevin, and Rebecca Cornell. Slavery Today. Toronto: Groundwood Books, 2008. 
Befu, Harumi. Hegemony ofHomogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis ofNihonjinron. 
Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001. 
Bigg, Claire and Nata Imedaishvili. "Locals Helpless As Sex Tourism Hits Georgian Black Sea 
Village." Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. 08 Jui. 2012 < 
http://www.rferl.orglcontentllocals-helpless-as-prostitutes-take-over-georgian­
village/24638723.html>. 
Brody, Betsy. Opening the Doors: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Globalization in Japan. New 
York: Routledge, 2001. 
Cornyetz, Nina. "Fetishized Blackness: Hip Hop and Racial Desire in Contemporary Japan." 
Social Text 41 (1994): 113-139. 
Creighton, Millie. "Soto Others and Uchi Others: Imagining Racial Diversity, Imagining 
Homogenous Japan." Japan's Minorities: The Dlusion ofHomogeneity. Ed. Michael 
Weiner. New York: Routledge, 1997.211-238. 
Dean, Meryll. "Sold in Japan: Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation." Japanese Studies. 
28.2 (2008): 165-178. 
Democracy and Freedom Watch. "Police Action Against Chinese settlement in Tblisi." 18 Jan 
2012. < http://dfwatch.netlpolice-action-against-chinese-settlement-in-tbilisi­
36289/lilo_city_woman _and_child>. 
Dinan, Kinsey Alden. "Migrant Thai Women Subjected to Slavery-Like Abuses in Japan." 
Violence Against Women 8.9 (2002): 1113-1139. 
ENAPATES (European NGOs Platform Against Trafficking Exploitation and Slavery). "Georgia 
Country Profile." 2012. <http://enpates.org/dynamic/docs/GeorgiaCountryProfile.pdf>. 
74 
FriedrichlAmy, Anna Meyer, and Iltborah Perlman. Paper pr,paredfor UCLA School ofPublic 
Affairs. 2006. "The Trafficking in Persons Report: Strengthening a Diplomatic Tool." 
Friman, Richard H. "Informal Economies, Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Drug Crime in 
Japan." Journal ofEthnic & Migration Studies. 27.2 (2001):313-333. 
Friman, Richard H. "Migrant Smuggling and Threats to Social Order in Japan." Global Human 
Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. Eds. David Kyle and Rey Koslowsky. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press, 2011. 325-351. 
Hicks, George. The Comfort Women: Japan's Brutal Regime ofEnforced Prostitution in the 
Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997. 
International Labor Organization. Human Traffickingfor Sexual Exploitation in Japan. Geneva, 
2005. 
International Monetary Fund. "Report for Selected Countries and Subjects." < 
http://www.imf.orgl external/pubslftJweo/20 12/02/weodatalweorept.aspx?pr .x=48&pr. y= 
7&sy=2010&ey=2017&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=915%2C158&s= 
LUR%2CLE%2CLP&grp=0&a= >. 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan's Actions to Combat Trafficking in Persons; 
A Prompt and Appropriate Response from a Humanitarian Perspective. Tokyo. 2007. 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "MOFA: If your objective is work or a long term 
stay" < http://www.mofa.go.jp/jjnfo/visitlvisallonglindex.html>. 
Japanese Ministry of Justice. Immigration Control: Data Section < http://www.moj.go.jp 
Icontentl000007271.pdf> Tokyo. 2005. 
Japanese Ministry of Justice. Immigration Control: Data Section < http://www.moj.go.jp 
Icontentl000007282.pdf> Tokyo. 2006. 
Japanese Ministry of Justice. Immigration Control: Data Section < http://www.moj.go.jp 
Icontentl000007305.pdf> Tokyo. 2007. 
Japanese Ministry of Justice. Immigration Control: Data Section < http://www.moj.go.jp 
I contentl000007318.pdf> Tokyo. 2008. 
Japanese Ministry of Justice. Immigration Control: Data Section < http://www.moj.go.jp 

Icontentl000007332.pdf> Tokyo. 2009. 

Japanese Ministry of Justice. Immigration Control: Data Section < http://www.moj.go.jp 

Icontentl000058065.pdf> Tokyo. 2010. 

75 
I 
Japanese Ministry of Justice. Immigration Control: Data Section < http://www.moj.go.jp 
Icontentl000081973.pdf> Tokyo. 2011. I I 
Japanese Ministry of Justice. Immigration Control: Immigration Control in Recent Years. 
< http://www.moj.go.jp/contentl000105779.pdf> Tokyo. 2012. 
Japanese Ministry of Justice. Immigration Control in Recent Years: Data Section. < 
http://www.moj.go.jp/contentlOOO1 05781.pdf> Tokyo. 2012. 
Japanese International Training Cooperation Organization. "Outline ofTechnical 
Internship Training Program" < http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/itp/index.html>. 
Japanese Policy Agency. Hoanka. Heisel 23 Nenjuu ni Okeru Jinshin-torihiki Jihan ni 
Tsuite. Tokyo. 2012. 
Kala, Muhammed Enes. "A Critical View on Normative Cultural Relativism." Review ofthe 
Faculty ofDivinity ofDokuz Eyul University 33 (2011): 203-218. 
Komai, Hiroshi. Migrant Workers in Japan. Trans. Jens Wilkinson. London, New York: Paul K, 
1995. 
Komai, Hiroshi. Foreign Immigrants in Contemporary Japan. Trans. Jens Wilkinson. Melbourne: 
Trans Pacific Press, 2001. 
Kondo, Atsushi. ""Japanese Experience and Response in Combating Human Trafficking." 
Human Security, Transnational Crime, and Human Trafficking: Asian and Western 
Perspectives. Eds. Shiro Okubo and Louise Shelley. New York: Routldge, 2011. 216-232. 
Leupp, Gary P. Interracial Intimacy in Japan: Western Men and Japanese Women, 1543­
1900.Continuurn International Publishing Group, 2003. 
Lie, John. "Invisibility and Cohabitation in Multiethnic Tokyo." The Other Global City. Ed. 
Shail Mayaram. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Liu-Farrer, Gracia."Creating a Transnational Community: the Chinese Newcomers in Japan." 
Japan's Minorities: The Illusion ofHomogenity. Ed. Michael Weiner. 2nd ed. New York: 
Routledge, 2009. 116-138. 
Mahdavi, Pardis. Gridlock: Labor, Migration, and Human Trafficking in Dubai. Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2011. 
Marfording, Annette. "Cultural Relativism and the Construction of Culture: An Examination of 
Japan." Human Rights Quarterly 19.2 (1997): 431-448. 
Mazrui, Ali. "Globalization and Cross-Cultural Values: The Politics ofIdentity and Judgment." 
Arab Studies Quarterly 21.3 (1999): 97-109. 
76 
I Metraux, Daniel. Japanese Economy and the American Businessman. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen I 
Press, 1989. 
Morita, Seiya. "Pornography, Prostitution, and Women's Rights in Japan." Notfor Sale: 
Feminists Resisting Prostitution and Pornography. Ed. Christine Stark, Ed. Rebecca 
Whisnant. Australia: Sphinx Press, 2005. 64-84. 
Morooka, Junya. "The Rhetoric of the Foreign Worker Problem in Contemporary Japan." Diss. 
University ofPittsburgh, 2006. 
Muroi, Hisae and Naoki Sasaki, "Tourism and Prostitution in Japan." Notfor Sale: Feminists 
Resisting Prostitution and Pornography. Ed. Thea M. Sinclair. Australia: Sphinx Press, 
2005. 64-84. 
Murphy-Shigematsu, Stephen. "Identities of Multiethnic People in Japan." Japan and Global 
Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent ofa Multicultural Society. Eds. Mike 
Douglas and Glenda S. Roberts. New York: Routledge, 2000. 196-214. 
Parreiias, Rhacel Salazar. Dlicit Flirtations: Labor, Migration, and Sex Trafficking in Tokyo. 
Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011. 
Piper, Nicola. "Labor Migration, Trafficking and International Marriage: Female Cross-Border 
Movements into Japan." Asian Journal ofWomen's Studies 5.2 (1999): 69-99. 
Randolf, David S. "Filipino Workers in Japan: Vulnerability and SurvivaL" Kasarinlan 6.3 
(1992): 9-23. 
Roberts, Glenda. liNGO Support for Migrant Workers in Japan." Japan and Global Migration: 
Foreign Workers and the Advent ofa Multicultural Society. Eds. Mike Douglas and 
Glenda S. Roberts. New York: Routledge, 2000. 275-300. 
Roth, Joshua Hotaka. Brokered Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Migrants in Japan. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2002. 
Ruenkaew, Pataya. "Female Thai Migrants in Japan." Jenda-Kenkyuu 5(2002): 47-69. 
Ryang, Sonia. "Visible and Vulnerable: The Predicament of Koreans in Japan." Diaspora 
Without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009.62-80. 
Saito, Yuriko. "Trafficking of Thai Women to Japan and Countermeasures of the Thai 
Government." Human Security, Transnational Crime, and Human Trafficking: Asian and 
Western Perspectives. Eds. Shiro Okubo and Louise Shelley. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
233-252. 
77 
Sellek, Yoko. Migrant Labour in Japan. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 
/ I I I 
Shelley, Louise. Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective. New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Siddle, Richard. "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People." Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of 
Homogeneity. New York: Routledge, 1997. 17-49. 
Siddle, Richard. "Race, Ethnicity, and Minorities in Modern Japan." Routledge Handbook of 
Japanese Culture and Society. Eds. Victoria Lyon Bestor, Theodore C. Bestor, Akiko 
Yamagata. Oxon and New York: Taylor and Francis, 2011. 150-162. 
Shahinian, Gilnara. "Trafficking in Persons in the South Caucasus - Annenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia: New Challenges for Transnational Democracies." Trafficking in Humans: 
Social, Cultural, and Political Dimensions. Eds. Sally Cameron and Edward Newman. 
Tokyo, New York, and Paris: United Nations University Press, 2008. 
Shergelashvili, Nodar. "Georgia Confronts the Human Trafficking Trade." Democracy and 
Freedom Watch 23 Jun. 2012 < http://dfwatch.netlgeorgia-confronts-the-human­
trafficking-trade-37282>. 
Shibuichi, Daiki. "The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All 
the Fuss." Asian Survey 45.2(2005): 197-215. 
Shoji, Rutsuko. "Twenty Years of 'Human Trafficking' - Experiences at the Women's Shelter, 
HELP, Interview with Ms.Rutsuko Shoji." Women Asia 21.15 (2005): 4-8. 
Soh, C. Sarah. The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and 
Japan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Suzuki, Nobue. "'Japayuki,' or, Spectacles for the Transnational Middle Class." Positions 19.2 
(2011): 439-462. 
Tai, Eika. "Korean Japanese." Critical Asian Studies 36.3 (2004): 355-382. 
Tanaka, Yuki. Japan's Comfort Women. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
Tsuda, Takeyuki. Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2003. 
United Nations. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime. Vienna. 2001. 
United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime. Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns. Vienna 
2006. 
78 
I United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime. Global Report on Trafficking in Persrms. Vienna. 
2012. 
United States. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington. 2004. 
United States.J?epartment of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington. 2005. 
United States. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington. 2007. 
United States. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington. 2008. 
United States. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington. 2009. 
United States. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington. 2010. 
United States. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington. 2011. 
United States. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington. 2012. 
Weiss, Ayla. "Ten Years of Fighting Trafficking: Critiquing the Trafficking in Persons Report 
through the Case of South Korea." Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 13.2 (2012): 305­
339. 
Wieringa, Saskia. 2009. "Silence, Sin, and the System: Women's Same-Sex Practices in Japan". 
In Women's Sexualities and Masculinities in a GlobaliZing Asia. Eds. Front Cover 
Evelyn Blackwood and Abha Bhaiya. Basingstoke: Pal grave Macmillan. 
World Bank. "Georgia - Data" < http://data.worldbank.org/country/georgia#cp_wdiR>. 
World Bank. "GDP (current $) - Data" < http://data.worldbank.org/indicatorINY.GDP. 
MKTP .CD?order=wbapi _data_value _2011 +wbapi _data _ value+wbapi_ data _ value­
last&sort=desc> . 
World Bank. "Japan - Data" < http://data.worldbank.org/country/japan#cp_wdi >. 
Yamaga-Karns, Kevin. "Pressing Japan: Illegal Foreign Workers Under International Human 
Rights Law and the Role of Cultural Relativism." Texas International Law Journal 13.2 
(1995): 559-581. 
Yamanaka, Keiko. "Transnational Community Activities ofVisa-Overstayers in Japan: 
Governance and Transnationalism from Below." Multiculturalism in the New Japan: 
Crossing the Boundaries Within. Eds. Nelson H.H. Grabum, John Ertl, and R. Kenji 
Tierney. New York: Berghahn Books, 2008. 
Yoshiaki, Yoshimi. Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World 
79 
War II. Translated by Suzanne O'Brien. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 
I ) I I I 

80 

